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THE FOURTH YEAR OF FORGETTING:  THE TROUBLING 
EXPANSION OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
DAWN CARLA NUNZIATO∗ 
ABSTRACT 
In its famous "right to be forgotten" decision, the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union ruled in 2014 that search engine opera-
tors must, upon request from a data subject, remove links that re-
sult from searches for an individual’s name when those results are 
“inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in rela-
tion to the purposes… carried out by the operator of the search en-
gine.”  The initial implementation of the right to be forgotten was 
limited in several ways.  First, it was limited in geographical scope 
to European domains of search engines.  Google—the primary 
search engine affected by the decision—limited delisting to its Eu-
ropean domains (such as Google.es and Google.de) and refrained 
from implementing such delisting within its global Google.com 
search engine.  While Google has consistently sought to limit the 
geographical reach of the right to be forgotten decision, European 
data regulators have insisted upon its global implementation.  Sec-
ond, the implementation of the right to be forgotten was limited to 
search engines and only imposed delisting requirements on the 
search engines; it did not extend to the underlying content at issue, 
such as newspaper archives or other online content.  As such, the 
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right to be forgotten decision mandated only indirect—not direct—
censorship of the content to be forgotten.   
Recently, however, European courts have expanded the scope 
of the right to be forgotten (and related privacy rights) to mandate 
how newspapers and other Internet content providers make avail-
able content on the Internet, in some instances requiring erasure or 
anonymization of such content.  These expansions of the right to be 
forgotten have posed greater impositions on freedom of expres-
sion, including on the rights of United States citizens and members 
of the press to access information on the Internet regarding U.S. 
court decisions.  In addition, the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation—which went into effect in May 2018—
imposes even greater infringements on the right to freedom of ex-
pression and does not accord the fundamental due process rights 
of notice or the opportunity to be heard to affected speakers and 
publishers.  Furthermore, the right to be forgotten is expanding 
beyond Europe -- to countries such as India, Russia, Mexico, Japan, 
and Colombia -- and these countries are imposing expansive obli-
gations on search engines and Internet content providers to censor 
information on the Internet.   
While the right to be forgotten began as a right that was limited 
in scope—and had a limited effect on the free flow of information 
on the Internet—in the past four years it has rapidly expanded into 
a formidable global threat to freedom of expression. 
1. INTRODUCTION
It all began in 2009 when a Spanish lawyer named Mario 
Costeja González did what many of us do and ran a search for 
himself on Google.  Upon conducting the search, he came upon a 
newspaper article from 1998 in La Vanguardia, a popular Spanish 
newspaper that maintained an electronic news archive.  The news-
paper article referenced the forced sale at auction of Costeja Gonzá-
lez’s property to pay for his social security debts.  Costeja González 
was not happy with these search results and claimed that the arti-
cle and its ready accessibility via a Google search violated his pri-
vacy rights under the European Union’s Data Protection Directive.   
Five years later, in May 2014, the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union issued its decision in Costeja González’s favor in the 
now-famous case of Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protec-
ción de Datos (“Google Spain”).  In what has become known as the 
 “right to be forgotten” decision, the Court ruled that search engine 
operators like Google must, upon request from a data subject, re-
move links that result from searches for an individual’s name 
when those results are “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer rele-
vant, or excessive in relation to the purposes… carried out by the 
operator of the search engine.”1  In the years since the decision was 
handed down, Google has received requests from European data 
subjects to remove approximately two million links to web sites 
containing information about themselves and has granted over 
43% of these requests.2 
The initial implementation of the right to be forgotten in the 
immediate aftermath of the Google Spain case was limited in sev-
eral ways.  First, it was limited in geographical scope to European 
domains of search engines.  Google—the primary search engine af-
fected by the Google Spain decision—limited delisting to its Euro-
pean domains (such as Google.es and Google.de) and refrained 
from implementing such delisting within its global Google.com 
search.  While Google has sought from the outset to limit the geo-
graphical scope of the decision, European data regulators have re-
peatedly insisted upon the expansion of the geographical reach of 
the decision, to render the delisting mandate applicable globally to 
all of Google’s domains.  Second, the Google Spain decision’s rem-
edy was limited to search engines and did not extend to the web-
sites hosting the underlying content at issue, such as the newspa-
per archive that contained the article in the Google Spain case.  In 
the case of Mario Costeja González, for example, although Mr.  
Costeja González requested that the Court order the newspaper to 
take down or anonymize the article about him, the Court limited 
its ruling to ordering that Google delist the article upon a search 
for the data subject’s name.  As such, the Google Spain decision 
mandated only indirect—not direct—censorship of the content at 
issue, since the underlying content remained unaffected.  Recently, 
however, European courts have expanded the scope of this and re-
lated privacy rights to mandate how newspapers and other content 
                                                 
1  2014 E.C.R. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Pro-
tección de Datos and Mario Costeja González, 317, para. 94 [hereinafter Google 
Spain], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0131 [https://perma.cc/6X2F-6PCW].   
2  European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY 
REPORT (last updated June 19, 2017), 
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/?hl=en 
[https://perma.cc/ZR79-XUHZ] (noting that 900,665 out of a possible 2,080,903 
links to websites were delisted). 
 providers make available the underlying content at issue on the In-
ternet, in some instances requiring erasure or anonymization of the 
content in the news archives at issue.  These expansions of the right 
to be forgotten have posed ever greater impositions on freedom of 
expression, including on the rights of United States citizens and 
members of the press to access information on the Internet regard-
ing U.S. court decisions and proceedings involving European data 
subjects.  In addition, the European Union’s General Data Protec-
tion Regulation—which goes into effect in May 2018—will lead to 
even greater infringements on the right to freedom of expression 
and will not accord the fundamental due process rights of notice or 
the opportunity to be heard to affected speakers and publishers.  
To make matters worse, the right to be forgotten is expanding be-
yond Europe, to countries such as India, Russia, Mexico, and Ja-
pan, and these countries are imposing increasing obligations on 
search engines and the underlying websites at issue to remove in-
formation from the Internet.  What began as a right that was lim-
ited in scope—and had a limited effect on the free flow of infor-
mation on the Internet and United States citizens’ right to access 
such information—has rapidly expanded in the years since the 
Google Spain decision to a formidable global threat to freedom of 
expression. 
In Part I of this Article, I analyze the limited scope of the origi-
nal right to be forgotten decision, emphasizing the ways in which 
that decision was confined in its scope and geographical reach.  In 
Part II, I analyze a series of recent European privacy decisions that 
have expanded the breadth of the right to be forgotten and the as-
sociated right to privacy in several European countries and have 
disregarded the distinction the European Court of Justice drew be-
tween data controllers (who are subject to delisting obligations) 
and media sites (which are protected from delisting obligations by 
the right to freedom of expression and their journalistic privileges).  
In Part III, I examine the ongoing litigation between Google and 
the French Data Protection Authority over the geographical reach 
of the right to be forgotten.  While Google has insisted that the Eu-
ropean right to be forgotten should be geographically limited in its 
scope and implementation to searches involving and accessible by 
European data subjects, the French Data Protection Authority has 
insisted the European data protection laws extend extraterritorial-
ly, to all of Google’s domains, and that Google must implement the 
delisting mandated by the European right to be forgotten on all 
searches conducted by everyone around the world, including on 
all searches on Google.com.  In Part IV, I examine the recently 
 adopted General Data Protection Regulation—the successor to the 
1995 EU Data Protection Directive—and the ways in which this 
Regulation, which became effective in May 2018, further strength-
ens the ability of individuals to remove information about them-
selves from the Internet, to the detriment of Internet users’ free 
speech and due process rights.  Finally, in Part V, I canvass the ex-
pansion of the right to be forgotten beyond the European Union, to 
countries such as India, Russia, Mexico, Colombia, and Japan. I 
conclude by warning that, absent greater attention to these issues 
and absent the contraction of this rapidly expanding right to be 
forgotten, free speech on the Internet as we know it will continue 
to be imperiled. 
 
2.  THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THE ORIGINAL RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
DECISION 
 
The Google Spain case originated in 2009, when Spanish attor-
ney Mario Costeja González became aware that a Google search of 
his name returned links to a Spanish newspaper’s 1998 electronic 
archives containing a notice about a real estate auction of his prop-
erty connected with attachment proceedings for the recovery of his 
social security debts.3  Costeja González claimed that this search 
result from a Google search of his name was in violation of his 
rights under the EU Data Protection Directive, which requires that 
personal data only be processed by “data controllers” insofar as the 
data is adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to the pur-
pose for which the data is collected and processed.4  Costeja Gon-
zález initiated proceedings against the newspaper La Vanguardia 
(in which the notice originally appeared) and against Google Spain 
and Google Inc. before the Agencia Española de Protección de Da-
tos (“Spanish Data Protection Agency”).  Costeja González ad-
vanced two arguments in these proceedings.  First, he sought relief 
against the newspaper itself.  Against the newspaper, he argued 
that the notice should either be removed by the newspaper from its 
electronic archive, altered so that his personal data no longer ap-
peared in connection with the notice,5 or that the newspaper 
should employ technological means to direct search engines like 
                                                 
3  See Google Spain, supra note 1 at para. 14 (stating that Mr. Costeja González 
officially lodged his complaint on March 5, 2010). 
4  Id. at para. 15. 
5  Id. 
 Google to exclude the notice from its automatic indexing (by using 
exclusion protocols or codes such as “noindex” or “noarchive”).  
Second, he argued that Google Spain and Google Inc. should be re-
quired to remove links to the notice when a search was performed 
on his name.6 
The Spanish Data Protection Agency rejected Costeja Gonzá-
lez’s complaint against the newspaper La Vanguardia, holding that 
the publication of the notice was legally justified and indeed legal-
ly required by order of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 
which mandated the publication of the auction notice so as to se-
cure as many bidders as possible on the foreclosure of Costeja 
González’s home.7  Accordingly, the actual content regarding 
Costeja González’s home foreclosure was not removed from the 
newspaper’s website (and remains there to this day8), and the 
Agency did not require the newspaper’s website to implement 
technological means to prohibit the article from being indexed by 
search engines.  But the Agency upheld the complaint against 
Google Spain and Google Inc., and required these search engines to 
stop linking to the La Vanguardia notice when Internet users con-
ducted a search on Costeja González’s name.9  Google Spain and 
Google Inc. brought actions challenging the Agency’s decision be-
fore the Audiencia Nacional (“National High Court”) of Spain, and 
that court stayed those proceedings and referred the relevant ques-
tions to the European Court of Justice.10   
On the questions referred regarding the application of the EU 
Data Protection Directive, the ECJ reached several conclusions.  
First, the Court concluded that the search engine operators’ activi-
ties fell within the scope of “processing personal data.”11  Second, it 
held that a search engine operator is a “data controller.”12  Third, it 
concluded that the Directive applied to search engines based out-
side of Europe like Google.com whose business operates and prof-
                                                 
6  Id. 
7  Id. at para. 16 (noting that the Spanish Data Protection Agency rejected the 
complaint on July 30, 2010). 
8  See Subhasta D’immobles [Auction of Properties], La Vanguardia, Jan. 19, 
1998, at 23, available at 
http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.com/preview/1998/01/19/pagina-
23/33842001/pdf.html [https://perma.cc/2MKP-CUZE]. 
9  See Google Spain, supra note 1 at para. 17. 
10  Id. at para. 18. 
11  Id. at para. 41. 
12  Id. 
 its within Europe.13  Fourth, and importantly for our purposes, the 
Court drew a distinction between the processing of personal data 
carried out by search engines and the processing carried out by the 
publishers of websites like La Vanguardia.  On this point, the Court 
concluded that search engine processing constituted “processing of 
personal data” by a “controller” within the meaning of the EU Da-
ta Protection Directive, but that the processing by the newspaper 
website itself did not.  Further, the Court noted that processing by 
news websites fell within a separate category of processing “solely 
for journalistic purposes,” which benefited from exemptions from 
the requirements of the Directive.  The Court explained:  
[T]he processing of personal data carried out in the context 
of the activity of a search engine can be distinguished from 
and is additional to that carried out by publishers of web-
sites, consisting in loading those data on an internet page . . 
. [T]he activity of a search engine consisting in finding in-
formation published or placed on the internet by third par-
ties, indexing it automatically, storing it temporarily and . . 
. making it available to internet users . . . must be classified 
as ‘processing of personal data’ . . . when that information 
contains personal data and, second, the operator of the 
search engine must be regarded as the ‘controller’ in respect 
of that processing . . . .  
[In contrast,] the processing by the publisher of a web page 
consisting in the publication of information relating to an 
individual may, in some circumstances, be carried out ‘sole-
ly for journalistic purposes’ and thus benefit, by virtue of Ar-
ticle 9 of Directive 95/46, from derogations [or exceptions] 
from the requirements laid down by the Directive [includ-
ing exemptions and protections for freedom of expression], 
whereas that does not appear to be so in the case of the pro-
cessing carried out by the operator of a search engine.  It 
cannot therefore be ruled out that in certain circumstances 
the data subject is capable of exercising the [EU’s data protec-
tion] rights . . . against that operator but not against the publish-
er of the web page.14 
Thus, while the European Court of Justice in its Google Spain 
decision imposed de-listing obligations on search engines under the 
                                                 
13  Id. at para. 60. 
14  Id. at paras. 35, 85 (emphasis added). 
 Directive, it declined to impose any obligations on newspaper web-
sites themselves in light of the protections that the Directive recog-
nizes for journalistic purposes and for the protection of freedom of 
expression.   
On the basis of these provisions, the Court held that Google 
Inc. and Google Spain—but not the newspaper website La Van-
guardia—were bound by the Directive to process personal data of 
European data subjects only insofar as the processing was “ade-
quate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to the purpose for 
which it is collected and/or further processed.”15  Therefore, the 
Court held, a data subject may require a search engine to remove 
information that does not comply with these requirements.16  The 
Court concluded: 
[I]f it is found, following a request by the data subject . . . 
that the inclusion in the list of results displayed following a 
search made on the basis of his name of the links to web 
pages published lawfully by third parties and containing 
true information relating to him personally is, at this point 
in time, incompatible with . . . the Directive because that in-
formation appears, having regard to all the circumstances 
of the case, to be inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or 
excessive in relation to the purposes of the processing at issue 
carried out by the operator of the search engine, the infor-
mation and links concerned in the list of results must be erased.17  
The Court, however, qualified its ruling by observing that, in 
certain cases, the public’s interest in accessing information about 
an individual who has a role in public life may outweigh the data 
subject’s interest in having the link removed.18  It noted that “[i]f it 
appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role played by the da-
ta subject in public life, that the interference with the [data sub-
ject’s] fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant interest 
of the general public in having… access to the information in ques-
tion,” then the data subject’s right to be forgotten request should 
not be granted and the links should not be removed.19  According-
ly, the Court established a balancing test pursuant to which the 
search engine operator is required to weigh the data subject’s in-
                                                 
15  Id. at para. 72. 
16  Id. at para. 88. 
17  Id. at para. 94 (emphasis added).  
18  Id. at para. 97. 
19  Id. 
 terests in removal against the interests of the general public in ac-
cessing information of genuine import to the public.20  In applying 
its balancing test, the Court concluded that the interests of the gen-
eral public in accessing the information about Costeja González in 
this case did not outweigh his interests in securing removal of this 
information.  The Court explained: “[S]ince in the case in point 
there do not appear to be particular reasons substantiating a pre-
ponderant interest of the public in having, in the context of such a 
search, access to that information . . . the data subject may . . . re-
quire those links to be removed from the list of results.”21 
On the issue of how exactly a search engine operator is to im-
plement delisting requests from data subjects, the Court ruled that 
European data subjects have the right to approach the search en-
gine operator directly with their delisting claims under the Di-
rective and that the search engines must then make a determina-
tion whether to grant or deny the delisting request.22  For this 
reason, the Court’s decision does not merely provide a right of ac-
tion for data subjects to bring in courts of law or before their coun-
try’s Data Protection Authority; rather, it provides a right of action 
for data subjects to bring directly to the search engines themselves.  
Accordingly, the Court’s Google Spain decision essentially charges 
search engines with the requirement of implementing a system for 
evaluating and complying with such right to be forgotten requests.  
As the Court explained, “the data subject may address such a re-
quest directly to the operator of the search engine (the controller), 
which must then duly examine its merits [and determine whether 
to grant or deny the request].”23  The Court’s decision requires 
search engines like Google to act as the decision maker to deter-
mine whether to grant or deny a data subject’s delisting request in 
the first instance.24 
The original right to be forgotten decision, as I explain above, 
was limited in several ways.  Importantly, in reaching its decision, 
the European Court of Justice refused to impose any obligations on 
the underlying publisher of the information itself—La Vanguardia 
                                                 
20  Id. at para. 98. 
21  Id. 
22  Id. at para. 77. 
23  Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No 70/14, Judgment 
in Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protec-
ción de Datos, Mario Costeja González (May 13, 2014), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-
05/cp140070en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AD8-MFHM]. 
24  Id. 
 newspaper—holding that the newspaper was protected by the EU 
Data Protection Directive’s exemptions and protections for free-
dom of expression, as the newspaper was processing the data sub-
ject’s information “solely for journalistic purposes.”25  Recent Eu-
ropean court decisions, however, have refused to recognize the 
Directive’s—or similar national laws’—exemptions for newspa-
pers’ processing solely for journalistic purposes, and have imposed 
de-indexing, anonymization, and outright erasure obligations on 
newspapers and other internet publishers themselves.  This trend 
poses increasing dangers for freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press online, as I examine below. 
 
 
3.  EXPANSION OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN TO IMPOSE ERASURE 
AND ANONYMIZATION OBLIGATIONS ON NEWSPAPERS AND OTHER 
MEDIA WEBSITES 
 
Several European Courts have disregarded the exemption that 
the European Court of Justice recognized for newspaper websites’ 
processing of data for journalistic and expressive purposes, and 
have imposed de-indexing, anonymization, and even erasure obli-
gations on the newspapers themselves.  In a decision handed down 
in October 2015, the Spanish Supreme Court (the court of last re-
sort for non-constitutional matters) ruled that the right to be for-
gotten imposes obligations not just on search engines but on news-
papers and publishers of the underlying content as well.26  The 
                                                 
25  See Google Spain, supra note 1 at para. 18 (“[T]he processing by the publish-
er of a web page consisting in the publication of information relating to an indi-
vidual may, in some circumstances, be carried out ‘solely for journalistic purpos-
es’ and thus benefit, by virtue of Article 9 of Directive 95/46, from derogations 
from the requirements laid down by the directive [including exemptions and pro-
tections for freedom of expression] … It cannot therefore be ruled out that in cer-
tain circumstances the data subject is capable of exercising the rights referred to in 
Article 12(b) and subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 
95/46 against that [search engine] operator but not against the publisher of the 
web page.”) 
26  See S.T.S., Oct. 15, 2015 (J.T.S. No. 545/2015) (Spain) 
http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/contenidos.action?action=contentpdf&data
base-
match=TS&reference=7494889&links=%222772%2F2013%22%20%22545%2F2015
%22&optimize=20151019&publicinterface=true [https://perma.cc/75CS-GKWY] 
(concluding that the right to be forgotten imposes obligations on newspapers and 
publishers in addition to search engines).  
 Court held that such newspapers are required to adopt technical 
measures to exclude entire articles from being indexed by search 
engines, and to render the articles completely hidden and inacces-
sible via general search engines—not just upon the search of an in-
dividual’s name (as was the effect of the Google Spain decision’s 
mandate), but upon any search within any general search engine. 
At issue in the Spanish Supreme Court case was the request by 
two former drug traffickers to render inaccessible a news article 
that the national newspaper El País had published in 1985 about 
their conviction and imprisonment through any type of search on 
general search engines like Google.27  The data subjects claimed 
that they had overcome their drug addictions, served their sen-
tences, paid their debt to society, and returned to normal private 
and professional lives; and that therefore El País should be re-
quired to implement technical measures to prevent the webpage 
containing the article about them from being indexed by search 
engines in any manner, not just as a result of a search by their 
names (which is the relief that would be available to them against 
Google under the implementation of the Google Spain decision).  
The lower courts ruled in favor of the data subjects, and El País ap-
pealed to the Spanish Supreme Court.   
In its argument to the Spanish Supreme Court, El País argued 
that its initial publication of the news article about the data sub-
jects’ conviction and sentence was legal, as was the continued pro-
cessing and digitization of the article, and that its digital publica-
tion of the article was protected by the rights to freedom of 
expression and information under the European Convention of 
Human Rights.28  El País contended further that it should not be 
considered a “data controller” subject to the EU Data Privacy Di-
rective’s obligations, as transposed by Spain’s implementing legis-
lation.29  
The Spanish Supreme Court rejected El País’s arguments.  The 
                                                 
27  See Brett Allan King, Spain High Court Issues First Right to Forget Ruling, 
Bloomberg Law: Privacy & Data Sec., Oct. 28, 2015, 
(https://www.bna.com/spain-high-court-n57982062815/) 
[https://perma.cc/Y8BY-P43J] (summarizing the case of former drug traffickers 
who claimed their right to be forgotten against El País).  
28  Hugh Tomlinson, Case Law, Spain: A and B v Ediciones El País, Newspa-
per Archive to Be Hidden From Internet Searches but No “Re-writing of History”, 
Inforrm’s Blog, Nov. 19, 2015, https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2015/11/19/case-
law-spain-a-and-b-v-ediciones-el-pais-newspaper-archive-to-be-hidden-from-
internet-searches-but-no-re-writing-of-history-hugh-tomlinson-qc/ 
[https://perma.cc/7DY4-RYJG]. 
29  Id.   
 Court held, first, that the obligations that the relevant law imposed 
on data controllers extended not only to general search engines like 
Google, but also to El País to the extent that it was an operator of a 
news archives, because news archive operators had the technologi-
cal ability to indicate to general search engines whether to exclude 
certain articles from such search engine’s indexing, via the use of 
robot.txt code or metatags such as “noindex” or “noarchive.”  Sec-
ond, the Court held that the continued processing by El País of 
these data subjects’ personal data in its electronic news archive 
containing the subject article was no longer lawful under Spain’s 
law implementing the EU Data Protection Directive,30 because the 
data could no longer be said to be “adequate, relevant and not ex-
cessive.”31  The Court reasoned that, while El País indeed enjoyed 
the protections under Article 10 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights, these protections extended primarily to the report-
ing of current affairs, not to the archiving of news.  The Court ex-
plained that while the primary function of the press was to deliver 
news about current affairs, it was only a secondary task of the 
press to provide news archives to the public.  Although the article 
at issue contained true facts about judicial proceedings and crimi-
nal convictions that occurred in the 1980s, time had rendered the 
further processing of the data by El País no longer “adequate, rele-
vant, and not excessive.”  While El País’s initial publication of the 
article about the data subjects’ arrest and sentencing was justified, 
over time the processing of this data lost its justification, according 
to the Court.  Thus, in balancing the newspaper’s limited interest in 
maintaining a news archive containing this personal data against 
the damage to privacy and honor of the data subjects and their 
right to respect for their private lives, the latter interests out-
weighed the former.  The Court held that, given that the data sub-
jects were private figures and that there was no legitimate historic 
or public interest in their identities, the ongoing processing of their 
personal data was no longer justified.  Accordingly, the Court or-
dered El País to implement technical measures to prevent the news 
                                                 
30  See id. (holding that the continued processing of the data subjects’ personal 
data by the newspaper was illegal under Article 4 of Spain’s Ley Organica 
15/1999 de Proteccion de Datos de Caracter Personal (the Organic Law on the 
Protection of Personal Data), which transposed Article 6 of the EU Data Protection 
Directive.  Article 6 of the EU Data Protection Directive describes the data quality 
requirements of scope of collection and use of data, adequacy and relevance of 
data collected in relation to purpose of use, accuracy of data, use of data for no 
longer than is necessary to accomplish the purposes for which it was collected). 
31  Id.   
 article at issue from being indexed by search engines such as 
Google and to render the content of the news article essentially in-
accessible and invisible to the general public.32  
German courts have ruled in a manner similar to the Spanish 
Supreme Court in the El País decision and have imposed obliga-
tions directly on the newspapers and publishers of Internet content 
to use technological measures to render certain articles inaccessible 
to the general public.  The implications of one German court’s rul-
ing are even more problematic for free speech than the Spanish 
Supreme Court’s decision discussed above, as this court has im-
posed such obligations on newspapers with respect to news arti-
cles involving public figures.  In a recent case, the Highest Regional 
Court of Hamburg imposed obligations directly on a newspaper, 
despite the newspaper’s argument that it was protected by the 
journalistic privilege recognized by the European Court of Justice 
under the European Union Data Privacy Directive.33  The German 
case involved the publication by a national German newspaper of 
various articles in 2010 and 2011 describing criminal proceedings 
against a well-known politician accused of being a pedophile.  The 
accused data subject argued, inter alia, that the newspaper should 
be required to take measures to render the news articles about him 
inaccessible.  Despite the fact that the data subject was a well-
known politician and public figure, the appellate court granted the 
plaintiff’s claim that the newspaper implement technological 
measures to ensure that the subject articles could not be indexed by 
general search engines like Google.  The court rejected the argu-
ment that the newspaper enjoyed a journalistic privilege to make 
the news article available and accessible in electronic form—
declining to recognize an important limitation of the European 
                                                 
32  Sebastian Schweda, “Right to be Forgotten” Also Applies to Online News Ar-
chive, Supreme Court Rules, 1 EUR. DATA PROTECTION L. REV. 301, 302-03 (2015) (ex-
plaining that although the Spanish Supreme Court ruled in favor of the data sub-
jects, the Court overturned two of the lower courts’ rulings imposing obligations 
on El País.  First, the Court reversed the requirement that El País delete the names 
of the plaintiffs in the article, and second, the Court reversed the requirement that 
El País prevent indexing of the article within its own news archive search func-
tionality). 
33  Hanseatic Oberlandesgericht, Hamburg, 7 Zivilsenat [OLG, Hamburg] 
[Higher Regional Court, Hamburg, 7th Civil Division] Jul. 7, 2015, 7 U 29/12 
(Ger.) available at http://www.rechtsprechung-
ham-
burg.de/jportal/portal/page/bsharprod.psml?doc.id=KORE217942015&st=ent&
doctyp=juris-r&showdoccase=1&paramfromHL=true#focuspoint 
[https://perma.cc/W5NY-SETA]. 
 Court of Justice’s Google Spain decision34—and instead reasoned: 
[I]f the operator of a search engine [like Google] may be 
obliged . . . to block the accessibility of certain online infor-
mation upon a simple name search, this has to apply all the 
more to the originator of the information [the publisher or 
newspaper], regardless of whether or not he or she enjoys 
the press privilege.35  
As a result of these decisions by the Spanish Supreme Court 
and the Higher Regional Court of Hamburg, news articles about 
data subjects—including public figures like politicians—are no 
longer accessible to the general public, whether via a search on the 
names of the data subjects or via any other search on general 
search engines like Google.  The implementation of the right to be 
forgotten by these courts goes well beyond the implementation 
contemplated under the Google Spain decision, which only man-
dated that general search engines like Google modify search results 
that appear upon the search of an individual’s name.  As Jonathan 
Zittrain explained regarding the limitations of the original Google 
Spain decision: 
[T]he idea is not to remove certain indexed Web pages . . . 
from a search engine entirely, but only [to remove] that 
which appears as a search result under [the data subjects’] 
names. So, a document called “Jonathan Zittrain foreclosure 
of 123 Main St.” might be (if I were an EU citizen) ripe for 
removal as a result under “Jonathan Zittrain,” but not un-
der “123 Main St. foreclosure.”36   
This limitation, however, no longer stands after the decisions of 
these courts.  Because the courts ordered entire news articles re-
garding the data subjects to be rendered invisible to search engines 
like Google, the articles are no longer accessible by the general 
public via any search on a general search engine.  As a result, after 
these decisions:  
                                                 
34  See text accompanying note 14 (discussing journalistic purposes exception 
to delisting requirement under the right to be forgotten). 
35  Sebastian Schweda, Germany, Hamburg Court of Appeal Obliges Press 
Archive Operator to Prevent Name Search in Archived Articles, 1 EUR. DATA 
PROT. L. REV. 299, 300 (2015). 
36  Jonathan Zittrain, Is the EU Compelling Google to Become About Me?, 
HARVARD BLOGS: THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT (May 13, 2014), 
http://blogs.harvard.edu/futureoftheinternet/2014/05/13/is-the-eu-compelling-
google-to-become-about-me/ [https://perma.cc/CN32-EPR9]. 
 [S]earch engines [like Google] will be prevented from in-
dexing the respective webpage or (in the case of the ro-
bots.txt file) the entire website altogether, not only limited 
to the indexing by the names of the plaintiffs.  This means 
that the webpage cannot be found by any search engine . . . 
effectively excluding the information contained in it from 
being accessed by anybody via an Internet search, regard-
less of the search term used.37 
Courts in Belgium have gone even further than the courts in 
Spain and Germany in construing the right to be forgotten to im-
pose obligations on newspapers and other publishers.  In the 2016 
Belgian case of Olivier G v. Le Soir,38 the Belgian Court of Cassation 
(the court of last resort in Belgium) ordered a newspaper retroac-
tively to anonymize the online version of an article it had pub-
lished in 1994 concerning a fatal drunk driving accident caused by 
medical doctor Olivier G. The 1994 Le Soir article accurately de-
scribed the doctor’s role in the fatal accident, his conviction for 
drunk driving, and the death of two people involved.  In 2008, the 
newspaper Le Soir made its news archives—including the 1994 ar-
ticle at issue—available and accessible online, such that a search for 
the doctor’s name via a search engine or via the news archive’s 
search function resulted in a link to the 1994 article.  In 2010, the 
doctor—whose conviction was subject to a rehabilitation decision 
in 2006—requested that Le Soir anonymize the 1994 article to re-
place his name with the letter X.  Upon the newspaper’s refusal to 
anonymize the archived article, the doctor brought an action in the 
Belgian courts claiming that his right to privacy under Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights,39 and his concomitant 
                                                 
37  Schweda, “Right to be Forgotten”, supra note 32 at 304.   
38  Hof van Cassatie [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], 29 April 2016, AR C150052F, 
http://www.cass.be (Belg.) available at 
https://inforrm.files.wordpress.com/2016/07/ph-v-
og.pdf [https://perma.cc/326M-8AN2]. 
39  See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entering into force Sept. 3, 
1953, as amended by Protocol 11 (E.T.S. 155) which entered into force May 11, 
1994) [hereinafter European Convention].  Article 8 provides:  
“3. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
4. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
 right to be forgotten, were violated by the newspaper’s refusal to 
anonymize the article, and that these rights outweighed the news-
paper’s rights under Article 10 of the European Convention to 
freedom of expression.40  The trial court sided with the doctor, as 
did the intermediate appellate court, ordering the newspaper to 
anonymize the subject article in its news archive. 
On appeal to the Belgian Court of Cassation, the newspaper Le 
Soir argued that its right to freedom of expression protected its ini-
tial publication, as well as its subsequent archive, of the news arti-
cle at issue.  The Belgian Court of Cassation disagreed, holding that 
the right to be forgotten and associated privacy rights enshrined in 
Article 8 of the Convention (as well as in Article 17 of the Interna-
tional Convention on Civil and Political Rights or ICCPR41) pro-
vided a person who had been previously found guilty of a crime to 
object to elements of his criminal past being disclosed to the public 
and that this right justified limitations on the newspaper’s right to 
freedom of expression.  The Court held that, even though the 1994 
article had been lawfully published by Le Soir at the time, its digital 
archiving constituted a new disclosure of the doctor’s personal da-
ta that interfered with the doctor’s right to be forgotten and his 
right of privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention and 
Article 17 of the ICCPR.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
emphasized the fact that the doctor was a rehabilitated offender 
                                                                                                              
rights and freedoms of others.” 
40  European Convention, supra note 39, art. 10 provides: 
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall in-
clude freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers. … 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and re-
sponsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions 
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”).  
41  See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (providing that  
“1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on 
his honor and reputation. 
 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such inter-
ference or attacks”.).  
 and a private figure, and that the accident had occurred over 20 
years earlier.  Balancing the newspaper’s freedom of expression 
and right to create historically accurate archives against the doc-
tor’s right to privacy and right to be forgotten, the Court held that 
the doctor’s rights to privacy and to be forgotten outweighed a 
strict respect for the newspaper’s right to freedom of expression.  
In reaching its decision, the Court also recognized a troubling dis-
tinction between online and print journalism and held that free-
dom of expression and the journalistic privilege were more im-
portant in print than in online sources like Le Soir’s electronic news 
archives.  Accordingly, the Court held that the newspaper must 
remove all references to the doctor from the article in its online ar-
chives. 
As a result of the decision of the Belgian Court of Cassation, the 
information about the doctor’s drunk driving accident, arrest, and 
conviction are essentially erased from history by rendering the da-
ta subject anonymous, and such content can no longer be accessed 
by members of the public.42  The remedy ordered by this Court 
goes beyond the remedy ordered by the German and Spanish 
courts in the cases analyzed above, which left the underlying arti-
cles unmodified in the electronic news archives of the newspaper 
publisher.  Indeed, the Spanish Supreme Court expressly over-
turned the part of the lower court’s decision requiring that the 
newspaper redact the names of the plaintiffs in the original article, 
holding that a mandate that the newspaper edit or revise the un-
derlying article was not an appropriate role for the court and 
would be tantamount to revising history.43  The German court sim-
ilarly ruled that an order requiring that the newspaper retroactive-
ly edit its earlier articles was improper and rejected plaintiff’s re-
quest for this type of relief in that case.44  In contrast, the Belgian 
Court of Cassation failed to recognize the dangers of revising his-
tory and ordered the newspaper retroactively to anonymize the ar-
ticles in question in its electronic news archives.   
The Italian Supreme Court of Cassation has gone even further.  
In an unprecedented recent decision, the Italian Supreme Court of 
                                                 
42  Eric P. Robinson, Belgian Court Turns “Right to Be Forgotten” Into a Black 
Hole, BLOG L. ONLINE (July 19, 2016), 
http://bloglawonline.blogspot.com/2016/07/belgian-court-turns-right-to-
be.html [https://perma.cc/H8V2-AZPZ]. 
43  See Schweda, “Right to be Forgotten”, supra note 32 at 302-03. 
44  See Sebastian Schweda, Germany, Hamburg Court of Appeal Obliges Press 
Archive Operator to Prevent Name Search in Archived Articles, 1 EUR. DATA 
PROTECTION L. REV. 299, 300 (2015). 
 Cassation has surpassed the obligations imposed on newspapers 
by the Spanish, German, and Belgian courts analyzed above and 
has ruled that a newspaper must delete in its entirety a truthful 
and accurate news article that was only two and a half years old 
and must pay damages to the complaining data subject for leaving 
the article on its news archives for this period of time.45  The Italian 
case began when newspaper publisher PrimaDaNoi printed an arti-
cle in 2006 that truthfully and accurately described criminal pro-
ceedings that were brought against a local restaurant owner, which 
was undoubtedly a matter of public interest to the members of the 
community in which the restaurant was located.  Two years after 
the publication of the article, the restaurant owner requested that 
the newspaper remove the article (notwithstanding the fact that the 
criminal proceedings against him were still ongoing), claiming that 
the article tarnished his reputation and damaged the image of his 
restaurant.  When the newspaper refused to delete the article, the 
restaurant owner brought suit in the Court of Chieti at Ortona.  
That court held that, even though the article was only two years 
old and the criminal proceedings against the restaurant owner 
were still ongoing, the continued availability of the article in the 
newspaper’s electronic archive was no longer justified by the 
newspaper’s right to freedom of expression. 
The newspaper appealed the lower court’s decision to the Ital-
ian Supreme Court of Cassation, claiming that it enjoyed a journal-
istic privilege and right to freedom of expression to continue mak-
ing the news article available in its electronic archives.  The Italian 
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the restaurant owner’s 
right to privacy outweighed the right to freedom of expression and 
journalistic privilege of the newspaper.  In particular, the Italian 
Supreme Court held that the public interest in the subject matter of 
the article had been satisfied by the availability and public accessi-
bility of the article for two years.  That public interest had “ex-
pired” and became outweighed by the right of privacy of the res-
taurant owner after two years.  The Court explained:   
The time passed between the date [the article] was first 
published and the date when its removal was requested 
sufficed to satisfy the public interest as far as its right to be 
informed was concerned, and… therefore, at least from the 
date when the formal notice [to remove the article] was re-
                                                 
45  Cass., sez. un., 24 giugno 2016, n. 13161, Giur. it. 2016, II, 1 (It.) available at 
http://www.altalex.com/documents/news/2016/07/07/cronaca-e-diritto-all-
oblio [https://perma.cc/4ZUM-QRC9].  
 ceived, that data could no longer be disclosed [by the 
newspaper in its electronic news archive].46   
Accordingly, the Italian Supreme Court upheld the lower 
court’s order mandating the complete erasure of the article from 
the newspaper’s archive, holding that the news article had expired, 
“just like milk, yogurt, or a pint of ice cream.”47  In addition to 
mandating the complete erasure of the news article from the news-
paper’s digital archive, the Italian Supreme Court also upheld the 
portion of the lower court’s order mandating that the newspaper 
pay damages in the amount of 10,000 Euros to the restaurant own-
er and the restaurant itself as a penalty for having kept the article 
accessible in its digital archives after the data subject had requested 
removal and for longer than was necessary to serve the public in-
terest.  In essence, the Italian Supreme Court granted the data sub-
ject an entitlement to determine the length of time for which the 
news article about him could remain accessible and the date after 
which it no longer served the public interest for the article to re-
main accessible in the newspaper’s electronic archive.   
The decisions of these Spanish, German, Belgian, and Italian 
courts upset the balance that the European Court of Justice initially 
carefully established between data subjects’ privacy rights and 
newspapers’ right to freedom of expression and journalistic privi-
leges.  While the European Court of Justice expressly refused to 
impose any de-indexing, anonymization, or erasure obligations on 
the underlying news websites themselves, these European court 
decisions have shown little to no solicitude for the journalistic priv-
ileges and free expression rights of newspapers, and have expand-
ed the right to be forgotten and associated privacy rights in an un-
precedented and troubling manner, to the detriment of the rights 
of freedom of expression and access to information online.   
 
4.  GLOBAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN RIGHT TO BE 
FORGOTTEN 
 
In the initial right to be forgotten decision, the European Court 
                                                 
46  See Athalie Matthews, How Italian Courts Used the Right to Be Forgotten to 
Put an Expiry Date on News, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2016, 4:12 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/sep/20/how-italian-courts-used-
the-right-to-be-forgotten-to-put-an-expiry-date-on-news [https://perma.cc/EJF7-
6WXE]. 
47  Id. 
 of Justice in Google Spain did not directly address the question of 
whether a data controller like Google must implement delisting 
decisions globally (for all searches on Google.com, for example) or 
merely within Europe (for searches on Google’s European do-
mains, like Google.es).  While maintaining that search engines 
must provide “effective and complete protection” of data subjects’ 
right to privacy,48 and recognizing that the European Union sought 
to prescribe a broad territorial scope to its privacy protections,49 the 
Court did not speak directly to the question of whether search en-
gines like Google must implement delisting only on their European 
domains or on all of their domains.  When Google initially delisted 
the websites that Costeja Gonzalez requested that it delist, Google 
only removed them from its European country-specific versions of 
its search engine.  The websites at issue, however, remained acces-
sible on other versions of Google search, and, importantly, were 
available when a search was performed on the data subject’s name 
on Google.com.  Google’s implementation of delisting only on its 
European domains was unsatisfactory to European data privacy 
regulators, which have demanded that Google implement the right 
to be forgotten globally, not just within Europe, and a protracted 
legal battle between Google and the European data privacy regula-
tors—and in particular, the French data privacy regulator—has en-
sued.   
Although the European Court of Justice itself was silent on the 
issue of the geographical reach of the delisting mandate, European 
data privacy regulators have insisted that Google (and other search 
engines) implement the right to be forgotten globally, on all of 
Google’s domains, including Google.com, and not just within its 
European domains.  First, in issuing guidelines within a few 
months of the European Court of Justice’s right to be forgotten de-
cision, the EU Article 29 Data Protection Working Party—
composed of all the Data Protection Authorities in the European 
Union—determined that the EU Data Protection Directive’s priva-
                                                 
48  See Google Spain, supra note 1 at para. 38 ("[T]he operator of the search en-
gine as the person determining the purposes and means of that activity must en-
sure, within the framework of its responsibilities, powers and capabilities, that the 
activity meets the requirements of Directive 95/46 in order that the guarantees 
laid down by the directive may have full effect and that effective and complete 
protection of data subjects, in particular of their right to privacy, may actually be 
achieved."). 
49  See id. at para. 54 (“[I]t is clear… that the European Union legislature 
sought to prevent individuals from being deprived of the protection guaranteed 
by the directive and that protection from being circumvented, by prescribing a 
particularly broad territorial scope.”). 
 cy protections must be implemented globally and not just on data 
controllers’ EU domains.50  In November 2014, the EU Article 29 
Working Party adopted a framework for the implementation of the 
original right to be forgotten decision—Guidelines on the Imple-
mentation of the Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment 
on “Google Spain and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protec-
ción de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González”— in which the 
Working Party determined that in order to give full effect to the 
data subject’s rights as defined in the European Court of Justice’s 
ruling, de-listing decisions must be implemented in such a way as 
to guarantee full protection of data subjects’ rights.  The Working 
Party determined:   
[D]elisting decisions must be implemented in such a way 
that they guarantee the effective and complete protection of 
data subjects’ rights and that EU law cannot be circumvent-
ed . . . [L]imiting de-listing to EU domains on the grounds 
that users tend to access search engines via their national 
domains cannot be considered a sufficient mean to satisfac-
torily guarantee the rights of data subjects according to the 
ruling.  In practice, this means that . . . de-listing should also be 
effective on all relevant domains, including .com.51 
Second, the French Data Protection Authority—The Commis-
sion Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL) (the Na-
tional Commission on Data Processing and Liberty)—has waged a 
protracted legal battle against Google in an attempt to require 
Google to implement the right to be forgotten globally, across all of 
Google’s domains, including Google.com.  As France’s Data Pro-
tection Authority, CNIL is responsible for hearing matters in which 
data subjects claim that data controllers like Google have not 
properly protected their rights in making delisting and other data 
privacy decisions.  One such data subject, Dan Shefet, a lawyer in 
Paris—who had prevailed in a defamation suit against another par-
ty—requested that Google remove links to websites that were al-
leged to be defamatory of him, not just on Google.fr and on 
                                                 
50  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party WP 225, Guidelines on the Im-
plementation of the Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment on “Google 
Spain and Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario 
Costeja González” C-131/12, 2014, 9 [hereinafter Article 29 Data Prot. Working 
Party Guidelines], http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YZ4R-7A7Y].   
51  See id. (emphasis added). 
 Google’s other European domains, but globally, on Google.com.  
When Google refused to globally delist such sites, Shefet sought 
and obtained a court order from the Paris Tribunal de Grande In-
stance requiring that Google globally remove links to websites that 
were deemed to be defamatory of him, and threatening 
Google.com with a 1,000 Euro daily fine for noncompliance.52  
When Google still refused to comply, Shefet sought the assistance 
of CNIL.  CNIL had also received a number of complaints from 
other French data subjects who were not granted the delisting that 
they had requested from Google.  Acting on Shefet’s and other 
French data subjects’ behalf, CNIL wrote a letter on April 9, 2015, 
to Google regarding what CNIL deemed to be Google’s failure to 
fully implement its legal obligations under the European Court of 
Justice’s Google Spain decision by not delisting the requested links 
from all of its domains.53  
On April 24, Google responded that it would not change its 
practice of delisting only within its European domains.54  On May 
21, CNIL informed Google that it had fifteen days to comply with 
delisting across all of its domains.55  The notice indicated that if 
Google failed to comply with the order to delist globally within 15 
days, CNIL’s President would nominate a Rapporteur to draft a 
report recommending to the CNIL Select Committee that it impose 
sanctions on Google.56  On June 8, CNIL made public its Formal 
Notice to Google of its obligations to delist across all domains.57  
On June 18, Google met with CNIL for clarification regarding what 
was required in order for it to fully comply with the delisting or-
der.58  In July 2015, Google pushed back on the CNIL demand, and 
requested that CNIL withdraw its Formal Notice.59  After being 
                                                 
52  Owen Bowcott & Kim Willsher, Google’s French Arm Faces Daily €1,000 
Fines Over Links to Defamatory Article, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2014, 7:53 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/nov/13/google-french-arm-fines-
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53  Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés [CNIL] [National 
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2016, 3 (Fr.) available at 
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54  Id.   
55  Id. 
56  Id. 
57  Id. 
58  Id.   
59  Id. 
 granted an extension for compliance, Google requested an appeal 
of the order on July 30.60  The appeal was rejected on September 15, 
2015, and on September 25, 2016, CNIL initiated legal proceedings 
against Google.61   
In March 2016, in an apparent attempt to compromise with 
CNIL, Google began implementing a plan of extending its delisting 
under the right to be forgotten beyond its EU-country level do-
mains (like Google.fr), to all searches that appear to be conducted 
by European Union citizens on Google.com.62  Thus, under its ex-
tended implementation plan, if a French citizen conducted a search 
on Google.com, and if the search results included websites for 
which a French individual had requested delisting, Google would 
remove those websites from its search results for that search, even 
if the search were conducted on Google.com.  As Google ex-
plained: 
That means that if we detect you’re in France, and you 
search for someone who had a link delisted under the right 
to be forgotten, you won’t see that link anywhere on 
Google Search—regardless of which domain you use. Any-
one outside the EU will continue to see the link appear on 
non-European domains in response to the same search que-
ry.63   
Not surprisingly, CNIL found this compromise measure to be 
insufficient and incomplete.  The Commission’s order on March 10, 
2016, rejected Google’s compromise position.  In its order, CNIL 
explained:   
Only delisting on all of the search engine's extensions, re-
gardless of the extension used or the geographic origin of 
the person performing the search, can effectively uphold 
this right. The solution that consists in varying the respect 
for people's rights on the basis of the geographic origin of 
those viewing the search results does not give people effec-
tive, full protection of their right to be delisted.64   
CNIL provided further reasons in support of its conclusion that 
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63  Kent Walker, A Principle That Should Not Be Forgotten, GOOGLE BLOG (May 
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 Google’s compromise position was insufficient, noting that (1) per-
sonal or professional contacts living outside of Europe could still 
access the delisted search result linking to content that may in-
fringe the privacy of the person concerned; (2) personal or profes-
sional contacts living in Europe and using a non-European search 
engine extension (".com") with a non-French IP address could still 
access the delisted search result; and (3) the use of certain technical 
solutions by one conducting a search could easily get around 
Google's filtering system by allowing Internet users to change the 
geographic origin of their IP address.  CNIL emphasized that the 
European Court of Justice’s decision mandated “the effective ap-
plication of the fundamental rights of the individuals involved, i.e. 
the right of privacy and protection of their personal data, with no 
possible circumvention,”65 and that Google did not adequately pro-
tect those rights by partial delisting on some geographic domains 
and not others.  Referencing the Google Spain decision, CNIL con-
tended, “it is clear… that the European Union legislature sought to 
prevent individuals from being deprived of the protection guaran-
teed by the Directive and [to prevent] protection from being cir-
cumvented, by prescribing a particularly broad territorial scope.”66  
In essence, CNIL interpreted the European Court of Justice’s refer-
ence to “broad territorial scope” as mandating worldwide delisting 
by search engines like Google.67  In addition, CNIL explained that 
the Court’s requirement that “information in question no longer be 
made available to the general public” required nothing short of 
global delisting.  While recognizing the potential conflict between 
European data subjects' privacy rights and the rights of Internet 
users throughout the world to access information on the Internet, 
CNIL was particularly dismissive of the latter and maintained that 
Google must implement delisting globally “without restriction, 
even if it conflicts with foreign rights,”68 like the rights of citizens of 
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68  Id. (emphasis added).  This is not the first time that France has sought to 
impose its restrictions on Internet content globally, in a manner that conflicts with 
U.S. citizens’ First Amendment rights.  In the famous dispute between France and 
another U.S. Internet company, France objected when Internet search engine Ya-
hoo! hosted an auction site in which it allowed its subscribers to auction off Nazi 
memorabilia.  Under the French criminal law, it is illegal to “exhibit” in France 
public uniforms, insignias and emblems that “recall those used” by (1) an organi-
zation declared illegal in application of Article 9 of the Nuremberg Statute, such 
as the Nazi party, or by (2) a person found guilty of crimes against humanity. 
CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN] [PENAL CODE] art. R645-1 (Fr.), makes it illegal to “wear or ex-
 other countries to access information on the Internet.  CNIL further 
maintained that the Google Spain decision requires global delisting 
because once a company is considered a data processor within a 
country, all data processing activities of that company that stem 
from that country, regardless of where and in which domains they 
occur, are subject to the European data protection law.69  CNIL im-
                                                                                                              
hibit” in public uniforms, insignias and emblems which “recall those used” by (1) 
an organization declared illegal in application of Art. 9 of the Nuremberg Statute, 
or by (2) a person found guilty of crimes against humanity as defined by Arts. 
L211-1 to L212-3 or by the Law No 64-1326 of 1964-12-26.  Two French groups de-
voted to combating racism and anti-Semitism sued Yahoo! in France, claiming 
that Yahoo!’s hosting auctions of Nazi memorabilia violated French criminal law.  
See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 
(2001), rev’d, 433 F.3d 1199 (2006).  In its defense, Yahoo! claimed that, while it was 
willing to abide by French law within France, and while it removed Nazi memo-
rabilia from the French country-specific version of its site available at Yahoo.fr, it 
did not have the technological means to restrict only French users from accessing 
its auction site available at its internationally available site Yahoo.com.  Id. at 1185.  
Furthermore, Yahoo! argued, such Nazi-related content was protected under the 
First Amendment, and therefore Yahoo! enjoyed the right to make such content 
available to U.S. citizens via its servers for Yahoo.com, which were hosted in the 
United States.  Finally, and most importantly, Yahoo! asserted that France did not 
have jurisdiction over Yahoo!, a United States company whose servers were based 
in the United States.  The French court disagreed with Yahoo!, and held that Ya-
hoo! was in violation of French criminal law for hosting an auction of content that 
was illegal within France.  It rejected Yahoo!’s argument that there was no feasible 
way for Yahoo! to restrict access to such content only within France and ordered 
Yahoo! to take all appropriate measures to deter and prevent access to auctions of 
Nazi memorabilia on its site by French residents within three months of the 
court’s order or face a fine of 100,000 francs per day.  While Yahoo! fought this or-
der—for the next six years—in United States courts, along the way Yahoo! decid-
ed to cease hosting auctions of Nazi memorabilia within Yahoo.com.  According-
ly, the practical effect of the French court’s actions was to impose France’s speech 
restrictions beyond its borders, on a U.S. company, where the speech subject to 
restriction was protected by the First Amendment, in violation of generally-
accepted foundational principles of international law regarding the limited geo-
graphical scope of a sovereign’s laws.   
69  CNIL emphasized in its order that the European Court of Justice in its 
Google Spain decision held that a company is subject to jurisdiction as a data pro-
cessor within a country or territory “when the operator of a search engine sets up 
in a Member State a branch or subsidiary which is intended to promote and sell 
advertising space offered by that engine and which orientates its activity towards 
the inhabitants of that Member State.”  See Google Spain, supra note 1, at para. 20.  
Since Google met these requirements and is therefore considered a data processor 
within France, even though its processing may occur outside of France, CNIL con-
tends that it is within its authority to require action by Google outside of France 
for all of the “processing associated with the ‘Google Search’ service.”  CNIL, su-
pra note 53, at 7 (“[CNIL jurisdiction] therefore applies to all processing associated 
with the ‘Google Search’ service, since, within the meaning of Article 5-1-1 of the 
French Data Protection Act, Google France contributes, in French territory, to the 
activity of the search engine operator based in the United States, as stated in 
[Google Spain].”)  Finally, CNIL maintains that Google’s differentiation between 
 posed a financial penalty of 100,000 Euros against Google, Inc., for 
its continued failure to comply with CNIL’s order.  In May 2016, 
Google appealed CNIL’s order to the France’s Supreme Adminis-
trative Court (the Conseil d’État), which referred this question to 
the European Court of Justice.70   
Google has sought to advance its legal position against the ex-
traterritorial reach of the right to be forgotten in the court of public 
opinion, in France and throughout the world, as well as before the 
European Court of Justice.  In explaining the broader legal princi-
ples at stake in the decision now pending before the Court, Google 
has argued on its blog, and in an open letter in the popular French 
magazine Le Monde, that a ruling in favor of CNIL would open the 
floodgates to worldwide censorship of Google results based on a 
single repressive country’s laws:   
We comply with the laws of the countries in which we op-
erate. But if French law applies globally, how long will it be 
until other countries—perhaps less open and democratic—
start demanding that their laws regulating information 
likewise have global reach? This order could lead to a glob-
al race to the bottom, harming access to information that is 
perfectly lawful to view in one’s own country . . . We have 
received demands from governments to remove content 
globally on various grounds—and we have resisted, even if 
that has sometimes led to the blocking of our services.71   
In its arguments to the Court (and before the court of public 
opinion), Google correctly contends that countries should not be 
able to impose their laws on the Internet globally and should be 
required to limit the extraterritorial reach of their laws so as not to 
interfere with the political independence and sovereignty of other 
states, and that doing otherwise would quickly lead to a race to the 
bottom for Internet free speech.72  Although each country is enti-
                                                                                                              
domains is nothing more than a technical path differentiation, and that all of 
Google’s processing across its many domains still occurs as part of one and the 
same processing system.  Id. at 6.   
70  See Alex Hern, ECJ to rule on whether ‘right to be forgotten’ can stretch beyond 
EU, THE GUARDIAN (July 20, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/20/ecj-ruling-google-right-
to-be-forgotten-beyond-eu-france-data-removed [https://perma.cc/6LUS-JDZN].   
71  Kent Walker, A Principle That Should Not Be Forgotten, GOOGLE BLOG (May 
19, 2016), https://blog.google/topics/google-europe/a-principle-that-should-
not-be-forgotten [https://perma.cc/D5X4-H9BC].   
72  The Republic of Turkey, for example, in the past has repeatedly urged 
Google to block access throughout the world to content that allegedly insulted the 
 tled to determine what speech is protected and what speech is un-
protected within its territory and in particular to determine how to 
balance the freedom of speech against individuals’ right to privacy 
within its borders, countries do not and should not enjoy the pow-
er to implement their laws in ways that have an extraterritorial ef-
fect that spills over to restrict speech within other nations that have 
adopted different regimes for protecting speech.  A foundational 
principle of national sovereignty is that each nation possesses full 
control over the affairs within its territorial, geographic bounda-
ries.  Under generally applicable international law principles, ju-
risdiction is a nation’s assertion of power over the people, proper-
ties, and activities within its borders.  According to this 
foundational principle of international jurisdiction:  
The first and foremost restriction imposed by international 
law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permis-
sive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in 
any form in the territory of another State. [Jurisdiction] 
cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by 
virtue of a permissive rule derived from international cus-
tom or from a convention.73  
While nations enjoy the power to determine the substantive 
laws within their own territories, they generally do not enjoy the 
right to dictate laws that apply outside of their territories.  Thus, 
any order issued by a national or regional court mandating that a 
search engine delist certain websites should be given effect only 
within the geographical boundaries of that country or region.  As 
the United States Supreme Court recently emphasized, every na-
tion must “avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign au-
thority of other nations”74 and must ensure that the “potentially 
conflicting laws of different nations work together in harmony—a 
harmony particularly needed in today’s highly interdependent 
                                                                                                              
memory of its founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk—a criminal offense in Turkey.  
Although Google blocked access to such content for Internet users in Turkey, 
Turkish officials apparently claimed that this country-specific blocking was insuf-
ficient to protect the rights of Turks living abroad and demanded that Google 
globally block access to content that insults the memory of Ataturk.  Google 
properly refused to accede to this additional, overreaching request to export Tur-
key’s laws to the rest of the world.  See, e.g., ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF 
POWER, RIGHTS, AND RULE IN CYBERSPACE 284–85 (Ronald Deibert, et. al. eds., 2010).   
73  The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J., (ser. A.) 
No. 10, at 18–19 (Sept. 7).  
74  F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empargran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).  
 commercial world.”75  This mandate of limiting the extraterritorial 
reach of one nation’s laws reflects principles of customary interna-
tional law.76  U.S. courts have long adhered to this presumption 
against extraterritorial application of our nation’s laws in order to 
“protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of 
other nations which could result in international discord.”77  U.S. 
courts’ adherence to this presumption has been consistently ob-
served, even where the laws at issue sought to regulate conduct 
that was universally condemned, including crimes against humani-
ty,78 and courts have held fast to the “presumption that United 
States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.”79  
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has applied the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality in circumstances presenting a mere 
“risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability independently to 
regulate its own… affairs.”80  
The Republic of France has also recognized the strong pre-
sumption against the extraterritorial application of one nation’s 
laws.  Indeed, in a recent amicus brief to the United States Supreme 
Court in the case of Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,81 the 
French government argued that “international comity counsels 
against expansive extraterritorial application” of one nation’s laws, 
                                                 
75  Id. at 164–65. See also McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de 
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (affirming the District Court ruling that Congress 
has the power to apply the National Labor Relations Act to foreign-flag vessels 
while they are in American waters); Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 
U.S. 354, 382 (1959) (holding that the Jones Act is applicable to “foreign events, 
foreign ships, and foreign seamen… in accordance with the usual doctrine and 
practices of maritime law.”); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (uphold-
ing the long-held maritime principle that an Act will not apply to foreigners with 
respect to acts they engage in outside the dominion of the sovereign state enact-
ing).  
76  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§§ 403(1), 403(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 1987) (limiting the unreasonable exercise of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction with respect to a person or activity having connections with 
another State); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (identifying rule of construction as derived from the principle of “pre-
scriptive comity”). 
77  E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
78  See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (hold-
ing that under the Alien Tort Statute, there is a presumption derived from a tradi-
tional canon of interpretation against extraterritorial application of U.S. law, 
which serves to protect against clashes between U.S. law and the law of other na-
tions).  
79  Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007). 
80  F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., supra note 74, at 165. (emphasis added). 
81  Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 especially where such extraterritorial application would “interfere 
with the sovereign authority of foreign nations.”82  Indeed, in its 
amicus brief in that case, the French Government emphasized the 
general principle of international law “by which one sovereign 
power is bound to respect the subjects and the rights of all other 
sovereign powers outside its own territory.”83  The French Gov-
ernment explained that the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
tions makes clear that nations should refrain from exercising their 
jurisdiction to prescribe when the exercise of such jurisdiction is 
“unreasonable,” and that a key determinant of whether jurisdiction 
to prescribe is unreasonable is whether it would bring about “the 
potential for conflict with foreign law.”84  Where application of one 
nation’s laws would “conflict with… the legal systems of other na-
tions,” exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable and improper 
within the meaning of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
tions.85  Indeed, in its opinion in Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
Ltd, the United States Supreme Court cited these arguments from 
the French Government’s amicus brief in support of the Court’s 
holding that the United States laws at issue did not have extraterri-
torial application because of the “probability of incompatibility 
with the applicable laws of other countries.”86 
As discussed above, courts in the United States—and through-
out the world—have been particularly careful to avoid extraterrito-
rial application of national laws when doing so would conflict with 
the laws of other countries and the fundamental rights of citizens 
of other countries.87  Since the extraterritorial application beyond 
the European Union of the right to be forgotten and its delisting 
mandate would conflict with the laws of the United States and the 
First Amendment rights of U.S. citizens—as I explain in greater de-
tail below—the French Conseil D’État should not order Google to 
implement the right to be forgotten globally.   
Although the First Amendment does not mandate that every 
U.S. citizen has access to information about everyone else—and, 
indeed, provides much more limited protection to speech about 
private figures and matters of private interest than to speech about 
                                                 
82 Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respond-
ents at 3, Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).  
83  Id. at 10. 
84  Id. at 11. 
85  Id.  
86  Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 269 (2010). 
87  See text accompanying notes 74–80. 
 public figures and matters of public interest88—the right to be for-
gotten is currently being implemented by search engines like 
Google in the European Union in such a way that would be incon-
sistent with the First Amendment if Google were required by the 
French Conseil d’État to implement the right to be forgotten global-
ly.  In initially determining how to apply the European Court of 
Justice’s mandate as issued in the Google Spain case—in which the 
Court had substantially deferred to Google on matters regarding 
which delisting requests to grant and which to deny—Google cre-
ated the Google Advisory Council composed of a number of inter-
national free speech and privacy experts who advised the company 
in making its delisting decisions to take into account the data sub-
ject’s role in public life (with private figures meriting greater priva-
cy protection than public figures) and the nature of the information 
(i.e., whether the information related solely to private interests or 
to the public interest).  The Council advised Google that it should 
be more inclined to grant delisting requests when made by private 
figures and when made regarding matters that were solely of pri-
vate interest and less inclined to grant delisting requests when 
made by public figures and when made regarding matters of pub-
lic importance.89  To the extent that Google only granted delisting 
requests when made by private figures on matters of private inter-
est, the global implementation of the right to be forgotten would 
not necessarily be inconsistent with First Amendment rights of U.S. 
citizens and journalists to access and to communicate information 
and ideas.  As I have argued elsewhere,90 the First Amendment’s 
                                                 
88  See text accompanying notes 90–95. 
89 See THE ADVISORY COUNCIL TO GOOGLE ON THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN (Feb. 
6, 2015) [hereinafter Google Advisory Report], 
https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/archive.google.com/en//advisoryc
ouncil/advisement/advisory-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8D8-9J9L].  The 
Council’s proposed full list of criteria that Google should consider in implement-
ing the Google Spain decision were: (1) the data subject’s role in public life (with 
private figures meriting greater privacy protection than public figures); (2) the na-
ture of the information (with information in the public interest—such as infor-
mation relevant to political disclosure or relating to criminal activity—meriting 
greater free speech protections); (3) the source of the content and the motivation to 
publish it (with information provided by recognized bloggers or professional 
journalistic entities meriting greater free speech protections); and (4) in cases in-
volving criminal activity, the severity of the crime and the time that has elapsed 
since the crime occurred (with the recentness and severity of crimes militating 
against delisting). 
90  Dawn Carla Nunziato, Forget About It? Harmonizing European and American 
Protections for Privacy, Free Speech, and Due Process, in PRIVACY AND POWER: A 
TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE IN THE SHADOW OF THE NSA-AFFAIR, 314 (Russell A. Mil-
ler, ed., 2016).   
 strongest protections extend to information on matters of legiti-
mate public concern, as distinguished from information of purely 
private concern.  Thus, Google’s delisting of websites containing 
information about private figures and matters of only private con-
cern is not necessarily incompatible with the First Amendment 
rights of U.S. citizens to access information on the Internet.91  While 
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the state may not constitu-
tionally punish or restrict the “publication of truthful . . . infor-
mation about a matter of public significance,”92 it has also empha-
sized that the First Amendment’s strongest protections are 
reserved for information on matters of public significance or con-
cern—not on matters of private significance or concern.  As the Su-
preme Court explained, “Speech on matters of purely private con-
cern is of less First Amendment concern [than speech on matters of 
public concern].”93  In cases involving liability for or regulation of 
speech on matters of private concern, the Court has ruled that 
"[t]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues 
[and] there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue 
of ideas concerning self-government.”94  The Court has empha-
sized that “[w]hile speech [on matters of private concern] is not to-
tally unprotected by the First Amendment . . . its protections are 
less stringent.”95  Accordingly, if Google were required by the 
French Conseil D’État to delist (and, therefore, indirectly censor 
worldwide) websites relating only to matters of private importance 
involving only private European figures, such a mandate would 
not necessarily be inconsistent with the First Amendment. 
Google, however, in its delisting decisions has been compelled 
to go beyond the recommendations of the Google Advisory Coun-
cil in implementing the right to be forgotten, and—as ordered by 
the French Data Protection Authority CNIL—has delisted and in-
directly censored websites on matters of public importance to U.S. 
citizens.  For example, Google has been compelled to delist web-
sites involving United States judicial proceedings and court rec-
                                                 
91  See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749 
(1985) (holding that speech on matters of a purely private concern has less consti-
tutional value than speech on matters of public concern); Daniel J. Solove, The Vir-
tues of Knowing Less: Justifying Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L. J. 967, 975 
(2003) (arguing that speech of private concern is less valuable than speech of pub-
lic concern). 
92  Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107 (1979).   
93  Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., supra note 91, at 759. 
94  Id. at 760. 
95  Id. 
 ords indirectly censoring content that U.S. citizens have a constitu-
tional right to access.  Indeed, as the Reporters Committee on Free-
dom of the Press has managed to discover (notwithstanding the 
lack of meaningful transparency regarding Google’s delisting deci-
sions96 and the absence of notice provided by Google to delisted 
websites97) the French Data Protection Authority CNIL recently 
ordered Google to delist several U.S.-based websites devoted to 
discussions of legal proceedings against a French citizen under the 
Dodd-Frank Act (a U.S. securities law).98  In addition, CNIL has 
                                                 
96  Although Google provides its Transparency Report on European Privacy 
Requests for Search Removals, this report does not provide detailed, granular in-
formation about which requests for delisting Google grants and which it denies.  
See Transparency Report, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/?hl=en 
[https://perma.cc/7A9Y-VMW9].  Rather, the Report only provides high level 
data, such as the percentage of URLs removed from its search results, a list of the 
most affected sites, and twenty-three examples of the types of cases in which it 
has granted removal requests.  The latter is of particular concern, considering that 
Google has received and evaluated almost 700,000 requests for removal of approx-
imately two million websites.  Id.  These twenty-three examples are general and 
merely provide such information as: “After we removed a news story about a mi-
nor crime, the newspaper published a story about the removal action.  The [Unit-
ed Kingdom] Information Commissioner’s Office ordered us to remove the sec-
ond story from search results for the individual’s name.  We removed the page 
from search results for the individual's name.”  Id.  As other commentators have 
noted, “Beyond anecdote, we know very little about what kind and quantity of 
information is being delisted from [Google’s] search results, what sources are be-
ing delisted and on what scale, what kinds of requests fail and in what propor-
tion, and what are Google’s guidelines in striking the balance between individual 
privacy and freedom of expression interests.”  See Ellen Goodman, Open Letter to 
Google from 80 Internet Scholars: Release RTBF Compliance Data, MEDIUM (May 13, 
2015), https://medium.com/@ellgood/open-letter-to-google-from-80-internet-
scholars-release-rtbf-compliance-data-cbfc6d59f1bd#.ciqjk77th 
[https://perma.cc/Z2M9-29XU]. 
97  As discussed infra, the European advisory body on data protection and 
privacy—the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party—has determined that 
search engine operators should not inform content providers about decisions to 
remove access to websites before or even after the search engine operator has de-
cided to remove access to the website.  According to the Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party Guidelines, “Search engines should not as a general practice in-
form the webmasters of the pages affected by de-listing of the fact that some 
webpages cannot be acceded from the search engine in response to specific que-
ries . . . . No provision in EU data protection law obliges search engines to com-
municate to original webmasters that results relating to their content have been 
de-listed.  Such a communication is in many cases a processing of personal data 
and, as such, requires a proper legal ground in order to be legitimate.”  See Article 
29 Data Prot. Working Party Guidelines, supra note 50, at 10. 
98  As the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press set forth in its volun-
tary intervention in the CNIL v. Google case: 
The CNIL has ordered the delisting of links to U.S. websites containing 
court records and news coverage of court proceedings. For example, the 
 ordered Google to delist websites discussing a (public) Minnesota 
Court of Appeals decision against a French citizen.99  The global 
implementation of the European right to be forgotten—which 
would render inaccessible via Google and other search engines 
websites like these involving U.S. judicial proceedings and court 
decisions—would directly conflict with the First Amendment 
rights of U.S. citizens and members of the press to access such mat-
ters of public importance,100 as I discuss further below.   
                                                                                                              
CNIL recently ordered the delisting of six websites originating in the 
U.S.—all involving legal action against a complainant under the Dodd-
Frank Act, a U.S. securities industry law . . . . The links, either describing 
or displaying official court decisions, bear no connection to France other 
than through the French nationality of the defendant. The defendant’s 
employer is a New York-based company, and the allegations against him 
pertain to acts he committed outside of France as chief executive officer 
of that New York-based company . . . . In addition, the CNIL ordered 
Google to delist a link to a public Minnesota Court of Appeals decision, 
where the website’s sole association with France was the complainant’s 
nationality. The decision was considered so important to the people of 
Minnesota that it was made available on the Minnesota government’s 
website.   
See Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, French Council of State Litiga-
tion Department Voluntary Submission Intervention in Support of the Petition 
Submitted by Google Inc. and Against La Commission Nationale Informatique et 
Libertes (CNIL) in Support of Motion No. 399.922, at 13–14 
https://www.rcfp.org/sites/default/files/20161104-Google-v-CNIL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3TB8-UT47]. 
99  Id. 
100  CNIL’s efforts to compel Google to implement the European right to be 
forgotten globally is reminiscent of the dispute between two convicted German 
murderers and Wikipedia that involved the balance of Germany’s privacy laws 
against freedom of expression.  That dispute involved the attempt by Wolfgang 
Werle and Manfred Lauber—who were convicted and served time for the murder 
of famous German actor Walter Sedlmayr—to have their names removed from 
electronic news archives and media websites that accurately reported on their 
prosecution and conviction for the murder.  Referencing a German court decision 
that held that individuals have the right to no longer have their convictions re-
ported, Werle and Lauber brought suit against several media outlets, including 
Der Spiegel and Wikipedia, claiming that their names must be removed from the 
articles on these online media websites.  The Hamburg Court of First Instance 
granted the relief that Werle and Lauber sought, holding that the continued online 
publication of the names of the murderers violated their privacy rights and order-
ing the removal of their names from the subject articles.  See, e.g., Wolfgang Werlé 
and Manifred Lauber, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolfgang_Werl%C3%A9_and_Manfred_Lauber 
(last visited June 20, 2017) [https://perma.cc/B5T7-RG4H].  While the German 
Wikipedia site complied with the Hamburg Court’s decision, the U.S. version of 
the Wikipedia site did not, contending that it had a First Amendment right to con-
tinue to publish these individuals’ names in connection with its articles on the 
murder.  Wikimedia (Wikipedia’s parent company) appealed the Hamburg 
Court’s decision to the German Constitutional Court.  That Court reversed, ruling 
 U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence has consistently recog-
nized that the First Amendment’s strongest protections extend to 
matters of public importance and to matters involving public fig-
ures, and especially to those matters that go to the heart of self-
governance, including judicial proceedings.  The First Amendment 
provides individuals with the right to access information concern-
ing government decision-making and, in particular, with access to 
judicial records and judicial proceedings.101  Court decisions and 
court orders are generally publicly available so that individuals can 
hold the government properly accountable for its judicial decision-
making.  Granting individuals access to information regarding ju-
dicial proceedings is essential for individuals to serve as effective 
checks on the government.102  Oliver Wendell Holmes, then a Jus-
tice on the Massachusetts Supreme Court, recognized in 1884 that 
members of the public in a democracy must enjoy the right of ac-
cess to civil trial proceedings, which is rooted in the principles of 
democratic government.  As Holmes explained: 
It is desirable that the trial of [civil] causes should take 
place under the public eye . . . because it is of the highest 
moment that those who administer justice should always 
act under the sense of public responsibility, and that every 
citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes 
as to the mode in which a public duty is performed.103 
The modern Supreme Court has recognized that members of 
the public and the press have a First Amendment right of access to 
judicial proceedings and has held in particular that “a presumption 
of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our 
                                                                                                              
in favor of Wikimedia and holding that the lower court’s decision ordering Wik-
ipedia to remove the convicted murderers’ names from its articles would violate 
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press.  See, e.g., Judith Bruhn, Does 
A Murderer Have the Right to Be Forgotten?, FREE SPEECH DEBATE (Nov. 16, 2012), 
http://freespeechdebate.com/en/case/does-a-murderer-have-the-right-to-be-
forgotten/ [https://perma.cc/LK42-9X5P] (questioning whether an individual’s 
right to be forgotten should take priority over the public’s right to know about the 
individual's past, specifically involvement in past crimes). 
101  In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 1984) (establishing a 
First Amendment right of access to records submitted in connection with criminal 
proceedings); Oregon Publ'g Co. v. U.S. District Court, 920 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 
1990) (extending qualified right of access to plea agreements and related docu-
ments in criminal cases). 
102  See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 502 (1st Cir. 1989); In 
re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d at 52; United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 
1359–60 (3d Cir. 1994). 
103  Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884). 
 system of justice.”104  The Court has explained that our several First 
Amendment freedoms—the freedom of speech and of the press, 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances—“share a common core 
purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating 
to the functioning of government,” and that this purpose is ad-
vanced by public and press access to court proceedings.  All court 
proceedings, both criminal105 and civil,106 are presumed to be open 
and accessible to the public.107  This right of access is not limited to 
attending court proceedings but also extends to access to court 
documents.  As the Supreme Court has explained, the First 
Amendment provides a right of access to court documents to pro-
mote “the free discussion of governmental affairs,”108 so as to “en-
sure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and 
contribute to our republican system of self-government.”109  Re-
strictions on public access to information such as court records, 
court documents, and other government records, as well as re-
strictions on the ability of the press to publish information regard-
ing such information, are therefore presumptively incompatible 
with the First Amendment. 
Although, as discussed above, the right to be forgotten is not 
necessarily incompatible with the freedoms guaranteed by the First 
Amendment, this right has been implemented by Google—at the 
request of French data subjects and French Data Protection Author-
                                                 
104  Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980). 
105  All stages of criminal proceedings are presumed to be accessible to the 
public.  The public’s access will only be restricted if the court finds that the de-
fendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial is threatened.  Press-Enterprise v. Supe-
rior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984); Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 
11 (1986). 
106  All civil court proceedings are presumed to be open and accessible to the 
public.  A court will only restrict the public’s access to civil court proceedings if it 
finds that doing so serves an overriding public interest, that the public interest 
will be prejudiced in the absence of closure, that the closure is narrowly tailored 
to serve that interest, and that there is no less restrictive means to serve that over-
riding public interest.  Further, the court must give the public notice before it is-
sues an order restricting the public’s access to a civil court proceeding.  See NBC 
Subsidiary, Inc. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 4th 1178 (1999) (vacating lower court 
decision to restrict media outlets because there were no identified proceedings 
that would or did contain information justifying closure, and there were less re-
strictive means of achieving a fair trial). 
107  See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 44 U.S. 555 (1980); Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
108  Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. at 604 (citing Mills v. 
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1996)).  
109  Id. 
 ity CNIL—in ways that are incompatible with First Amendment 
freedoms by delisting websites involving U.S. judicial proceedings 
and court decisions.  If the French Conseil d’État were to uphold 
CNIL’s decision requiring Google to globally remove links to web-
sites that host items like these on all of Google’s domains including 
Google.com, such a decision would directly conflict with the rights 
of United States citizens and members of the press under the First 
Amendment to access this information.  This is especially problem-
atic given the extent to which French citizens avail themselves of 
requests to delist websites from search engines like Google.  Alt-
hough French citizens make up only 13% of the population of the 
European Union, requests from French citizens account for one-
third of the requests to delist that Google has received to date and 
Google has granted 49% of the delisting requests that it has re-
ceived from French citizens.110  If French citizens persist in de-
manding that Google delist websites, and if Google were required 
to implement such delisting globally across all of its domains, 
French (and other European) citizens would be able to exercise un-
precedented and unwarranted influence over the ability of other 
citizens—including United States citizens—to access information 
on the Internet that they have a constitutional right to access.   
The recent U.S. Second Circuit case of Martin v. Hearst111 under-
scores the pre-eminent First Amendment value of ensuring public 
access to information about criminal proceedings and protecting 
the right of the press—including the online press—to publish in-
formation about such proceedings, even under circumstances in 
which aspects of the proceedings had been “forgotten” or erased 
subject to a state expungement law.  Martin v. Hearst involved an 
arrestee’s attempt to implement a version of the right to be forgot-
ten in the United States, premised upon Connecticut’s Erasure 
Statute,112 which requires that criminal records related to an arrest 
be destroyed if the individual is subsequently found not guilty or 
pardoned or if the charges are dropped or “nolled” (i.e., subject to a 
nolle prosequi decision by the prosecutor or dismissed) and after 
which an arrestee is “deemed to have never been arrested within 
                                                 
110  In its latest Transparency Report, Google indicates that it has received 
221,561 requests for delisting from French citizens, out of a total of 685,240 re-
quests from citizens throughout the European Union.  See Transparency Report, 
European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, Google, 
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/?hl=en 
(last updated June 19, 2017) [https://perma.cc/P5P7-DUD2].   
111  777 F. 3d 546 (2d Cir. 2015). 
112  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54–142a(e)(3) (2017). 
 the meaning of the general statutes with respect to the proceedings 
so erased[.]”).113  In this case, Lorraine Martin and her two sons 
were arrested after police found drugs and drug paraphernalia 
upon a search of her home.  A few weeks after her arrest, several 
local newspapers published truthful and accurate articles reporting 
upon her arrest.  The state ultimately decided not to pursue its case 
against Martin and a nolle prosequi decision was entered, which en-
titled Martin to have her arrest records erased pursuant to the state 
Erasure Statute.  After her arrest records were erased pursuant to 
the statute, Martin requested that the newspapers remove the ac-
counts of her arrest from their news websites arguing that the stat-
ute requires the newspapers to give full effect to the statute’s man-
date that she is "deemed to have never been arrested . . . with 
respect to the proceedings so erased[.]”114  When the newspapers 
refused to remove the accounts of her arrest from their websites, 
Martin sued them for defamation, negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, and related invasion of privacy claims.115  
In rejecting Martin’s defamation, negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, and related invasion of privacy claims, the Second 
Circuit explained that the truth of the articles provided an unas-
sailable defense for the newspapers’ accurate reporting on Martin’s 
arrest and that the newspapers had a First Amendment right to 
publish the accounts in the first place—as well as to maintain the 
online news archives of such accounts.  Construing the state Eras-
ure Statute, the Second Circuit explained: 
The statute creates legal fictions, but it does not and cannot 
undo historical facts or convert once-true facts into false-
hoods. Neither the Erasure Statute nor any amount of wish-
ing can undo that historical truth . . . Because there is no 
dispute that the articles published by the Defendants accu-
rately report Martin's arrest, her various publication-related 
tort claims necessarily fail. Martin's claims for libel and 
placing another in a false light fail because the articles do 
not contain falsehoods. Her claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress fails because there is nothing negligent 
about publishing a true and newsworthy article.116 
The court explained that to hold the newspaper liable for any 
                                                 
113  Id. 
114  Id.  
115  Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F. 3d 546, 551 (2nd Cir. 2015). 
116  Id. at 551–552. 
 of these defamation or privacy torts would violate the newspaper’s 
rights under the First Amendment.  It explained that if a news or-
ganization “lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of 
public significance, then state officials may not constitutionally 
punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a 
state interest of the highest order.”117  The court concluded that, 
despite Martin’s privacy and reputational interests in securing the 
erasure of her arrest records from the state’s records, the newspa-
per nonetheless still enjoyed the right to publish truthful and accu-
rate news articles on such matters and members of the public enjoy 
a concomitant right to access such content on the Internet. 
In sum, the global implementation of the right to be forgotten—
as the French Data Protection Authority is now demanding before 
France’s highest administrative court—coupled with the mandate 
that Google indirectly censor websites on matters of public im-
portance to U.S. citizens (including on matters relating to U.S. judi-
cial proceedings and court records) is not only an unwarranted ex-
traterritorial extension of European jurisprudence to prescribe, but 
would also result in a direct conflict with the First Amendment 
rights of U.S. citizens and members of the press. 
 
5.  THE EUROPEAN UNION’S NEW PRIVACY LAW—THE GENERAL 
DATA PROTECTION REGULATION—WILL ONLY INCREASE THE 
PROBLEMS WITH THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
 
The various issues and problems analyzed above in connection 
with the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive and its interpretation 
by the European Court of Justice and European courts to support 
the right to be forgotten will only be exacerbated when the Di-
rective is superseded by the General Data Protection Regulation.  
In May 2018, the EU Data Protection Directive, under which the 
original right to be forgotten decision was recognized, was re-
placed by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a mas-
sive overhaul of European data privacy regulation.118  This Regula-
                                                 
117  Id. See also Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004) 
(explaining that news publishers cannot be held liable for invasion of privacy for 
reporting on plaintiff’s criminal record and criminal activities that occurred more 
than a dozen years prior). 
118  This Regulation, which was adopted in April 2016, entered into applica-
tion on May 25, 2018, after a transition period of two years.  In contrast to the 1995 
EU Data Protection Directive, the GDPR—because it is a Regulation rather than a 
Directive—does not require the European national governments to pass any ena-
 tion, adopted in April 2016, entered into application on May 25, 
2018, after a two-year transition period.  Unlike the 1995 EU Data 
Protection Directive, the Regulation does not require national gov-
ernments to pass any enabling legislation to enforce its terms since, 
as a Regulation, it is self-executing.  The General Data Protection 
Regulation, which updates and overhauls the 1995 EU Data Protec-
tion Directive, expressly provides that it extends to all foreign 
companies that process the data of EU residents, regardless of 
where those companies are located.  Unlike the 1995 EU Data Pro-
tection Directive, the Regulation expressly applies to organizations 
based outside the European Union if they process the personal da-
ta of EU residents.  The Regulation harmonizes the data protection 
regulations throughout the EU and imposes a strict compliance re-
gime on all foreign companies that control or process EU residents’ 
data.  Importantly, the Regulation imposes substantial fines—EUR 
20 million or 4% of a company’s total worldwide annual turnover 
of the preceding year, whichever is higher—on data controllers 
(like Google) who fail to comply with the Regulation’s strict terms 
for the protection of data.119 
Article 17 of the General Data Protection Regulation—entitled 
“Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’)”—specifically grants Eu-
ropean data subjects the right to require that data controllers erase 
and cease from redistributing personal information about the data 
subject without undue delay, if the data are no longer necessary in 
relation to the purposes for which they were collected or pro-
cessed, if the data subject withdraws consent on which the pro-
cessing was based, or where there is no legal ground for the pro-
cessing.  This Article further requires data controllers to inform 
downstream data processors of the data subject’s request for eras-
ure.  The applicable provisions from the Regulation and their com-
plex interactions are as follows:   
Article 17 Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) 
                                                                                                              
bling legislation to enforce its terms and will go into effect automatically upon its 
effective date.  See Daphne Keller, Intermediary Liability and User Content Under Eu-
rope’s New Data Protection Law, STAN. L. SCH.: THE CTR. FOR INTERNET AND SOC’Y 
(Oct. 8, 2015), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/10/intermediary-
liability-and-user-content-under-europe%E2%80%99s-new-data-protection-law 
[https://perma.cc/G5X6-UY2N]. 
119  See General Data Protection Regulation [hereinafter GDPR] 2016/679, art. 
83, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2016:119:FULL&from=EN 
[https://perma.cc/6ATJ-5RM9] (detailing the fines to be imposed on data control-
lers who fail to comply with the Regulation’s strict terms). 
 1. The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the 
controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or 
her without undue delay and the controller shall have the 
obligation to erase personal data without undue delay 
where one of the following grounds applies:  
(a) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to 
the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise 
processed;  
(b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the pro-
cessing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1),120 or 
point (a) of Article 9(2)121 and where there is no other legal 
ground for the processing; 
(c) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Ar-
ticle 21(1)122 and there are no overriding legitimate grounds 
                                                 
120  Id. Article 6(1)(a) provides that processing of personal data shall be lawful 
only if and to the extent that "the data subject has given consent to the processing 
of their personal data for one or more specific purposes." 
121  Id. Article 9(2)(a) provides that the prohibition set forth in Article 9(1) on 
the processing of special categories of personal data—defined as data revealing 
“racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or 
trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for 
the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or 
data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation”—shall not apply 
“if the data subject has given explicit consent to the processing of those personal 
data for one or more specified purposes, except where Union or Member State law 
provide that the prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 may not be lifted by the 
data subject.” 
122  Id. Article 21, the Right to Object, provides in Section 1: 
The data subject shall have the right to object, on grounds relating to 
his or her particular situation, at any time to processing of personal 
data concerning him or her which is based on point (e) or (f) of Arti-
cle 6(1), including profiling based on those provisions. The control-
ler shall no longer process the personal data unless the controller 
demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the processing 
which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject 
or for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims.   
Article 6, Lawfulness of Processing, provides in its Section(1)(e) and (f) that pro-
cessing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that:  
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in 
the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the 
controller;  
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests 
pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests 
are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular 
where the data subject is a child. 
 for the processing, or the data subject objects to the pro-
cessing pursuant to Article 21(2)123; 
(d) the personal data have been unlawfully processed; 
(e) the personal data have to be erased for compliance with 
a legal obligation in Union or Member State law to which 
the controller is subject; 
(f) the personal data have been collected in relation to the 
offer of information society services referred to in Article 
8(1).124 
2. Where the controller has made the personal data public 
and is obliged pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the person-
al data, the controller, taking account of available technolo-
gy and the cost of implementation, shall take reasonable 
steps, including technical measures, to inform controllers 
which are processing the personal data that the data subject 
has requested the erasure by such controllers of any links 
to, or copy or replication of, those personal data. 
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the extent that pro-
cessing is necessary: 
(a) for exercising the right of freedom of expression and in-
formation; 
(b) for compliance with a legal obligation which requires 
processing by Union or Member State law to which the con-
troller is subject or for the performance of a task carried out 
in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority 
vested in the controller; 
(c) for reasons of public interest in the area of public health 
                                                 
123  Id. Article 21, the Right to Object, provides in Section 2: 
Where personal data are processed for direct marketing purposes, the 
data subject shall have the right to object at any time to processing of 
personal data concerning him or her for such marketing, which includes 
profiling to the extent that it is related to such direct marketing. 
124  Id. Article 8(1) provides: “Where point (a) of Article 6(1) applies [(i.e., 
where the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal 
data for one or more specific purposes)] in relation to the offer of information so-
ciety services directly to a child, the processing of the personal data of a child shall 
be lawful where the child is at least 16 years old.  Where the child is below the age 
of 16 years, such processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that consent is 
given or authorized by the holder of parental responsibility over the child.” 
 in accordance with points (h) and (i) of Article 9(2)125 as 
well as Article 9(3)126; 
(d) for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or 
historical research purposes or statistical purposes in ac-
cordance with Article 89(1)127 in so far as the right referred 
to in paragraph 1 is likely to render impossible or seriously 
impair the achievement of the objectives of that processing; 
or 
(e) for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims. 
                                                 
125  Id. Article 9(2)(h) and (i) allow for the processing of special categories of 
personal data—defined as data revealing “racial or ethnic origin, political opin-
ions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the pro-
cessing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a 
natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex 
life or sexual orientation”—when “(h) processing is necessary for the purposes of 
preventive or occupational medicine, for the assessment of the working capacity 
of the employee, medical diagnosis, the provision of health or social care or treat-
ment or the management of health or social care systems and services on the basis 
of Union or Member State law or pursuant to contract with a health professional 
and subject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in paragraph 3; (i) pro-
cessing is necessary for reasons of public interest in the area of public health, such 
as protecting against serious cross-border threats to health or ensuring high 
standards of quality and safety of health care and of medicinal products or medi-
cal devices, on the basis of Union or Member State law which provides for suita-
ble and specific measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject, 
in particular professional secrecy.” 
126  Id. Article 9(3) allows for the processing of special categories of personal 
data—data revealing “racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philo-
sophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, 
biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data con-
cerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orienta-
tion”—“when those data are processed by or under the responsibility of a profes-
sional subject to the obligation of professional secrecy under Union or Member 
State law or rules established by national competent bodies or by another person 
also subject to an obligation of secrecy under Union or Member State law or rules 
established by national competent bodies.” 
127  Id. Article 89, entitled, “Safeguards and derogations relating to processing 
for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research pur-
poses or statistical purposes,” provides in Section 1: 
Processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or his-
torical research purposes or statistical purposes, shall be subject to ap-
propriate safeguards, in accordance with this Regulation, for the rights 
and freedoms of the data subject. Those safeguards shall ensure that 
technical and organizational measures are in place in particular in order 
to ensure respect for the principle of data minimization. Those measures 
may include pseudonymisation provided that those purposes can be ful-
filled in that manner. Where those purposes can be fulfilled by further 
processing which does not permit or no longer permits the identification 
of data subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner. 
 Although the above language from the Regulation nominally 
provides the data controller with a “freedom of expression” de-
fense to the data subject’s erasure request, other aspects of the 
Regulation—including the exorbitant fines for noncompliance and 
the “necessity” caveat on the freedom of expression defense—will 
likely skew the balance in favor of the data subject’s removal rights 
and against the data controller’s right to freedom of expression.  
Other procedural aspects of the Regulation’s contemplated review 
and removal process will also tilt the balance in favor of erasure 
and against freedom of expression.  As data protection expert 
Daphne Keller explains, the Regulation’s terms—including the re-
quirement that the data controller take down personal data imme-
diately (while evaluating the merits of the data subject’s claim) and 
the burden of proof placed on the data controller, coupled with the 
exorbitant financial penalties for noncompliance—will create an 
unprecedented imbalance in the Internet ecosystem in favor of data 
subjects’ erasure requests and against the right to access and right 
to publish information on the Internet,128 as I examine below. 
First, Article 12 of the Regulation—in its provision of guide-
lines for data controllers like Google for facilitating the exercise of 
data subjects’ rights under Article 17’s right to erasure/right to be 
forgotten—provides that controllers shall act “without undue de-
lay,” which in general means “within one month of receipt of the 
[data subject’s] request.”129  Article 12 further provides that the da-
ta controller may refuse to take action on the data subject’s right to 
be forgotten/right to erasure requests only if the requests from the 
data subject are “manifestly unfounded or excessive.”130  The bur-
den of proving that the data subject’s requests are “manifestly un-
founded or excessive,” however, falls on the data controller.  If the 
data controller is disinclined to grant the data subject’s removal re-
quest—because the controller believes the request to be manifestly 
unfounded or excessive, for example—the data subject nonetheless 
has the right to secure the temporary takedown of his or her per-
sonal data from all public websites under Article 18 of the Regula-
tion.  That is, the default under the Regulation is that the data sub-
                                                 
128  See Daphne Keller, The Final Draft of Europe’s “Right to Be Forgotten” 
Law, Stan. L. Sch.: The Ctr. for Internet and Soc’y (Dec. 17, 2015) 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/12/final-draft-europes-right-be-
forgotten-law [https://perma.cc/FM2G-T7BE] (explaining that the Regulation’s 
terms will create an unprecedented balance on the Internet in favor of data sub-
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129  See GDPR, supra note 119, at art. 12(3). 
130  Id.   
 ject has the right to have the websites containing his or her person-
al data taken down during the pendency of the data controller’s 
consideration of the data subject’s request.  As Daphne Keller ex-
plains in interpreting the interplay of these Articles, search engines 
like Google “must take the challenged content offline immediately, 
before weighing the public interest [in keeping the website up] and 
perhaps before even looking at the content.”131  In other words, a 
search engine or other data controller is required to restrict the 
processing of data pending its verification of whether the legitimate 
grounds of the data controller override those of the data subject.132 
Importantly, one essential element that is conspicuously absent 
from the Regulation is the provision of notice and an opportunity 
to be heard for the website publisher or speaker whose speech is 
being erased or delisted.  The Regulation’s contemplated regime 
for data controllers’ evaluation of erasure/right to be forgotten re-
quests does nothing to remedy the procedural defects in the deci-
sion-making process contemplated by the European Court of Jus-
tice’s right to be forgotten regime under the 1995 EU Data 
Protection Directive, under which no notice or opportunity to be 
heard is to be granted to the affected speakers or publishers, either 
before or after a decision has been made to delist their websites.133  
As I have argued elsewhere, to the extent that the right to eras-
ure/right to be forgotten is implemented in a manner that fails to 
accord notice or an opportunity to be heard to speakers or publish-
ers whose content is to be indirectly censored by a search engine, 
such a process is radically deficient from the perspective of funda-
mental shared notions of due process principles.134  Fundamental 
                                                 
131  Id.   
132  See Keller, supra note 128. 
133  Under the decision-making regime contemplated under the original right 
to be forgotten decision, search engines like Google are prohibited from providing 
notice or an opportunity to be heard to websites whose content a data subject re-
quests to be delisted.  The EU Article 29 Working Party has also concluded that 
search engines should not provide notice to websites whose content is delisted 
and that there is no legal basis for providing such notice.  In its Guidelines, the 
Working Party indicates:  
Communication to website editors on the de-listing of specific links. 
Search engines should not as a general practice inform the webmasters of 
the pages affected by de-listing of the fact that some web pages cannot be 
acceded from the search engine in response to a specific name-based 
query. There is no legal basis for such routine communication under EU 
data protection law.   
See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party Guidelines, supra note 50, at 9. 
134  See Nunziato, supra note 90, at 304 (explaining that the process through 
which Google has implemented the Court’s decision fails to provide the proce-
 shared notions of due process of law require that an individual be 
granted notice and the opportunity to be heard and to state her 
case to an impartial decision-maker before she is deprived of her 
fundamental rights—including her right to freedom of expression.  
The U.S. Constitution’s Due Process provisions, for example, re-
quire that any such deprivation of individuals’ right to freedom of 
expression occur only as a result of a fair, independent, and impar-
tial decision-making process in which affected parties are provided 
with meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard before a 
decision is rendered.135  Before the state deprives an individual of a 
substantial liberty interest such as the right to freedom of expres-
sion, the individual must be accorded: adequate notice of the basis 
for government action; an opportunity to be heard by the decision-
maker; and a determination by an impartial decision-maker.  Im-
portantly, when the state seeks to authorize a restriction on an in-
dividual’s freedom of expression, prior notice to that individual 
must be provided (“An elementary and fundamental requirement 
of due process in any proceeding . . . is notice reasonably calculat-
ed, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the . 
. . action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions.”).136  Absent such procedural safeguards, state-authorized 
restrictions on expression are unconstitutional.  These fundamental 
due process principles are recognized in the governing documents 
of the European Union as well.  With respect to the determination 
of civil rights and obligations, Article 6 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights provides for the general right to procedural 
fairness, including a hearing before a fair, independent, and impar-
tial tribunal that provides a reasoned judgment.137  In each of these 
foundational documents and instruments, procedural due process 
rights and the right to independent, impartial, and fair judicial de-
terminations of one’s civil and human rights are recognized as nec-
essary for the meaningful protection of substantive rights—
including the right to freedom of expression—in the European Un-
ion.  The European Court of Human Rights has emphasized the 
                                                                                                              
dural safeguards necessary for the protection of speech under fundamental no-
tions of due process shared by both the US and the European legal systems). 
135  1 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise On Constitutional Law: 
Substance And Procedure § 17.4(c) (5th ed. 2012). 
136  Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
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within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law.”). 
 centrality of the rights of procedural due process articulated in Ar-
ticle 6 of the European Convention and has affirmed that an expan-
sive view of these procedural rights is fundamental to protecting 
civil and human rights.138  
Because the General Data Protection Regulation charges the 
search engine/data controller with making the decision whether to 
grant the data subject’s request to delist or erase the website(s) at 
issue without hearing from one side (i.e., the publisher or speaker 
of the content), this process is severely deficient from the perspec-
tive of fundamental principles of due process shared by both the 
United States and the European Union and will undoubtedly lead 
to a lopsided consideration of the merits of the privacy versus free 
speech interests at stake.  This factor—coupled with the exorbitant 
fines that can be levied against data controllers for failure to com-
ply with the Regulation’s strict erasure mandates—will likely pro-
duce an Internet ecosystem that fails to adequately balance free 
speech interests against competing privacy interests.   
In short, rather than remedying the imbalance between privacy 
and free speech interests and the due process concerns that have 
developed as a result of the implementation of the Google Spain’s 
right to be forgotten decision under the 1995 European Union Data 
Protection Directive, the General Data Protection Regulation exac-
erbates such problems and skews the playing field and the Internet 
ecosystem even further in favor of censorship in the name of priva-
cy and against freedom of expression on the Internet. 
 
6.  THE EXPANSION OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN BEYOND THE 
MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
The expansion of the scope and geographical reach of the right 
to be forgotten from the limited scope and reach of the decision as 
originally recognized by the European Court of Justice in 2014 is 
problematic in a variety of ways, as I have analyzed above.  Yet, 
the difficulties that the right to be forgotten poses for the right to 
freedom of expression online will only multiply as other countries 
adopt versions of that right and as they attempt (as France has 
done) to implement their version of the right beyond their borders.  
The right to be forgotten is no longer confined to the member states 
of the European Union, and, in the three years since it was recog-
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 nized by the European Court of Justice, has expanded to other 
countries in Europe as well as to countries in Asia and the Ameri-
cas, including Mexico, Japan, Russia, Colombia, and India.   
Mexico. In 2014, Mexico adopted a framework similar to that 
adopted by the European Court of Justice in its Google Spain deci-
sion in a case decided by Mexico’s National Institute for the Access 
to Information (INAI) under its Federal Personal Data Protection 
Processed by Private Entities Act.139  Under this Act, every person 
has the right to request the cancellation of his or her personal data 
and the right to oppose its processing.140  Article 25 of the Act 
grants data subjects the right to request that a data controller stop 
processing and that the data controller (partially or completely) 
erase his or her personal data.  Once a data subject makes a request 
to the data controller to cancel the processing of his or her personal 
data, the data controller must stop processing such personal data 
immediately, subject to certain limited exceptions.141  In addition, 
Article 27 of the Act grants data subjects the right to prevent a data 
controller from continuing to process the data subject’s personal 
data for any legitimate reason.  In a recent landmark case, Carlos 
Sanchez de la Pena, a Mexican businessman and data subject who 
objected to negative but truthful comments about his business 
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 dealings on various websites (including discussions of the gov-
ernment’s bailout of his business for various bad loans), argued 
that Google should be required to delist these articles, notwith-
standing the fact that they were truthful and that they arguably in-
volved matters of public concern.  The National Institute for the 
Access to Information agreed with de la Pena and ordered Google 
to remove the search results upon a search of de la Pena’s name on 
Google’s Mexican search domain.142  This decision suggests that 
Mexico’s newly-enshrined right to be forgotten will be implement-
ed in a manner that fails to account for the right to access speech on 
matters of public importance and public concern. 
Japan. Only a few months after the European Court of Justice’s 
Google Spain decision, a Japanese court issued the country’s first 
right to be forgotten decision.  In October 2014, the Tokyo District 
Court issued an injunction ordering Google to delist websites relat-
ing to the past criminal activity of a Japanese man.  Since then, Ya-
hoo! Japan has implemented a procedure through which Japanese 
individuals can request that Yahoo! Japan delist websites that con-
tain information that they believe interferes with their right to pri-
vacy.143  Yahoo! Japan will delist websites that contain information 
about individuals’ sensitive information that individuals seek to 
have removed, including their past criminal offenses.   
Russia. The Russian Federation recently enacted its right to be 
forgotten law, which came into effect on January 1, 2016.  In enact-
ing the law, Russian lawmakers referred explicitly to the European 
Court of Justice’s Google Spain decision and borrowed from that 
decision’s reasoning and from the underlying European Union’s 
Data Protection Directive.144  The law grants Russian data subjects 
the right to request delisting from any search engine that makes 
available advertising directed at individuals residing in the Rus-
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 sian Federation.  As under the European Union’s Data Protection 
Directive, under the Russian right to be forgotten law, data subjects 
are granted the right to request the delisting of websites containing 
information about them where the information is inaccurate, out of 
date, or irrelevant.145  In addition, the Russian right to be forgotten 
law grants data subjects a general purpose right to request the 
delisting of any information about them that is disseminated “con-
trary to Russian law,” including, for example, “instructions on 
manufacturing of drugs, information about committing suicide, in-
formation on gambling, [and] pornography.”146  Specifically, the 
Russian right to be forgotten law provides that search engines op-
erators must “stop providing links to websites . . . [that are] dis-
tributed in violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation, 
[are] inaccurate and dated, [or] which [have] lost meaning for the 
application by virtue of any subsequent events or actions taken by 
the applicant.”147  Notably, the Russian right to be forgotten law 
does not provide for any exceptions to that right for matters of 
public interest or for public figures,148 and, as such, will likely have 
harmful consequences for the free flow of information in Russia.   
Colombia. Colombia’s Constitutional Court has adopted a par-
ticularly problematic interpretation of the right to be forgotten, one 
that applies directly against the underlying websites at issue in-
stead of merely against search engines like Google including in the 
context of websites’ truthful and accurate reporting about a crimi-
nal prosecution.  In a decision reached in 2015, the Colombian 
Constitutional Court granted an individual’s request to de-list in-
formation about her criminal prosecution against the original news 
website itself and required the newspaper El Tiempo to use tech-
nical measures (such as the robots.txt file) to ensure that the web 
pages at issue in its news archives—which truthfully described the 
individual’s prosecution for slave trafficking—could not be in-
dexed by search engines.149 
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 India. In early 2017, an Indian court of appeals, the Karnataka 
High Court of India, was the first in the nation to judicially recog-
nize an Indian data subject’s right to be forgotten.150  The court’s 
landmark ruling recognizing the right to be forgotten is particular-
ly problematic because it mandated the anonymization of infor-
mation involving court records that were in the public domain.  
The case involved the interests of a woman who had previously 
been married, but who later sought a judicial annulment of that 
marriage.  The father of the woman petitioned the court to remove 
her name from the court records involving the annulment, claim-
ing on behalf of his daughter that the public accessibility of the 
court records involving the annulment of her marriage would af-
fect her relationship with her current husband and her reputation 
in society.  The Karnataka High Court granted the father’s request 
to anonymize his daughter’s name in the court records involving 
the previous request for annulment, holding that the recognition of 
the right to be forgotten in this instance was “in line with the trend 
in western countries of the ‘right to be forgotten’ in sensitive cases 
involving women in general and highly sensitive cases involving 
rape or affecting the modesty and reputation of the person con-
cerned.”151  This case creates precedent for the removal of infor-
mation from the public domain and from electronic court records 
and therefore is a particularly problematic application of the right 
to be forgotten.   
With the recent adoption of versions of the right to be forgotten 
in several other countries in Europe as well as in Asia and the 
Americas, one-third of the world’s population now lives under a 
regime in which search engines—and in some cases news, media, 
and government websites themselves—are under an obligation, di-
rectly or indirectly, to censor content that is claimed to violate the 
privacy rights (or, as in India’s case, the modesty and reputational 
interests) of a complaining data subject.  The expansion of the geo-
graphical scope and reach of the right to be forgotten will pose in-
creasing dangers to the Internet ecosystem and the free flow of in-
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 formation on the Internet. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
 
When the European Court of Justice initially enshrined the 
right to be forgotten in May 2014, it created a limited right and im-
posed a limited remedy—one that applied only to search engines, 
that only mandated delisting of certain search results by search en-
gines (not erasure or anonymization by the offending websites 
themselves), and that only applied to search engines’ European 
domains.  As the right to be forgotten enters its fourth year of en-
actment, the right has been expanded in a myriad of ways that 
pose grave concerns for freedom of expression on the Internet: it 
has been applied to require news, government, and other websites 
to erase and anonymize content regarding matters of public im-
portance; it has been recognized in at least six new countries in Eu-
rope, Asia, and the Americas; and, if the French Data Protection 
Authority has its way, it will be implemented globally, to all 
searches on Google.com, for example, to censor the content acces-
sible by Internet users across the globe, regardless of whether they 
live in a country that recognizes the right to be forgotten.  To make 
matters worse, the data protection regulation that went into effect 
in May 2018 grants even greater rights to data subjects to secure 
the removal of Internet content with which they disagree, without 
according fundamental due process protections—notice and an 
opportunity to be heard—to those whose speech is to be censored.  
Absent greater attention to these issues, and absent the contraction 
of this rapidly expanding right to be forgotten, free speech on the 
Internet as we know it will continue to be imperiled.   
 
